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ABSTRACT

Today, the Federal Reserve is at a critical juncture in its evolution.
Unlike any prior period in U.S. history, the Fed now faces increasing
demands to expand its policy objectives to tackle a wide range of social
and political problems—including climate change, inequality, and
foreign and small business aid.
This Article develops a framework for recognizing and identifying the
problems with “central bank activism.” It refers to central bank
activism as situations in which immediate public policy problems push
the Fed to aggrandize its power beyond the text and purpose of its legal
mandates, which Congress has established. To illustrate, this Article
provides in-depth exploration of both contemporary and historic
episodes of central bank activism, thus clarifying the indicia of central
bank activism and drawing out the lessons that past episodes should
teach us going forward.
This Article urges that, while activism may be expedient in the near
term, there are long-term social costs. Activism undermines the
legitimacy of central bank authority, erodes central bank political
independence, and ultimately renders a weaker central bank. In the
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end, this Article issues an urgent call to resist the allure of activism. And
it places front and center the need for vibrant public discourse on the
role of a central bank in American political and economic life today.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 20, 2021, Joe Biden was sworn in as 46th President of
the United States. A few hours into his first day in office, President
Biden promised to “[c]ontrol the pandemic,” “[p]rovide economic
relief,” “[t]ackle climate change,” and “[a]dvance racial equity.”1 To be

1. Joe Biden (@POTUS), TWITTER (Jan. 21, 2021, 6:03 PM), https://twitter.com/POTUS/
status/1352029117974278145 [https://perma.cc/H4GV-ZKNT].

SKINNER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

CENTRAL BANK ACTIVISM

10/22/2021 9:59 AM

249

sure, that is a veritable list of problems that require serious policy
solutions. But among the various federal government institutions
equipped to play a part, this Article questions whether the U.S. central
bank—the Federal Reserve (“Fed”)—should have an outsized role.
Indeed, the Fed has been pulled to the center of a wide range of
social, political, and economic debates more forcefully than any other
federal government agency or institution.2 It has, for example, been
called upon to help small business and local government, mitigate
climate change, and redress wealth and income inequality, particularly
along racial and ethnic lines.3 The Fed is not alone. Central banks

2. A number of legal academics have advocated an expanded role of the Fed of late. See,
e.g., Jonathan Macey, Fair Credit Markets: Using Household Balance Sheets To Promote
Consumer Welfare, 100 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 46, 52–54),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3781164 [https://perma.cc/6EBS-UGBW]
(arguing for new Fed facilities that would be made available to individuals facing emergency
liquidity needs); Saule T. Omarova, The People’s Ledger: How To Democratize Money and
Finance the Economy, 74 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 4–5),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3715735 [https://perma.cc/CA44-NK36]
(arguing for an expanded use of the Fed’s balance sheet to deliver more direct financial services
to citizens); John Crawford, Lev Menand & Morgan Ricks, FedAccounts: Digital Dollars, 89 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 113, 115–19 (2021) (arguing for expanded access to bank accounts at the Fed). So,
too, have policymakers. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Racial and Economic Equity Act, H.R. 2543,
117th Cong. (2021) (“The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal
Open Market Committee shall exercise all duties and functions in a manner that fosters the
elimination of disparities across racial and ethnic groups with respect to employment, income,
wealth, and access to affordable credit . . . .”); Federal Reserve Racial and Economic Equity Act,
S. 1327, 117th Cong. (2021) (same); Uplifting Our Local Communities Act, H.R. 7498, 116th
Cong. (2020) (proposing to enable the Fed to finance state and local governments during “unusual
and exigent circumstances,” such as the COVID-19 pandemic); BIDEN-SANDERS UNITY TASK
FORCE, BIDEN-SANDERS UNITY TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS: COMBATTING THE
CLIMATE CRISIS AND PURSUING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 64, 74 (2020), https://joebiden.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/UNITY-TASK-FORCE-RECOMMENDATIONS.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KVLT26R] (calling on the Fed to “significantly elevate racial equity as part of its mandate by targeting
not just the overall unemployment rate but disparate unemployment rate based on race” and
provide “affordable bank account[s]” for all Americans and “create a real-time payment system,
so families and individuals do not have to wait days for their checks to settle”).
3. See BIDEN-SANDERS UNITY TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 18; H.R. 7498; Rebecca
Christie, Opinion, Central Banks Don’t Have To Pick Winners and Losers To Fight Climate
Change, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 11, 2021, 11:30 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
central-banks-dont-have-to-pick-winners-and-losers-to-fight-climate-change-11614701257
[https://perma.cc/UYZ9-WH2T]; Victoria Guida, An Activist Central Bank? Dems Push the Fed
To Fight Racial Inequality, POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://politi.co/3lxbdqC
[https://perma.cc/6ZS6-SS4W]; Rachel Siegel, To Narrow Racial and Economic Disparities,
Atlanta Fed Chief Raphael Bostic Is Rethinking What the Fed’s Mandate Means, WASH. POST
(Aug. 21, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/08/21/bostic-fed-raceeconomy [https://perma.cc/ 76VA-XHDQ].

SKINNER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

250

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/22/2021 9:59 AM

[Vol. 71:247

around the world are now perceived to have “quite a bit” to do with
“social justice and environmental decay.”4
But this vision of central banking expands their role immensely.
Central banks are constituted to be monetary authorities, and in many
countries, bank regulators and supervisors, too.5 Addressing a broader
panoply of social ills largely falls outside their wheelhouse, for lack of
the legal authority to do so and the policy tools to get such jobs done.
Still, regardless of these limitations, as renowned financial historian
Harold James recently remarked, the tremendous social, economic,
and political shocks of the past ten years have put intense pressure on
central banks to “multi-task.”6
In some quarters, central bankers seem keen to engage in this
mission creep. Christine Lagarde, president of the European Central
4. Balazs Koranyi, Francesco Canepa & Frank Siebelt, From Climate Change to Equality,
Lagarde Turns ECB More Political, REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2020, 2:10 AM), https://reut.rs/34qGi99
[https://perma.cc/FS93-DTFX]; Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, Inequality, Climate Change and the Role
of Central Banks, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2019, 7:41 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/pedrodacosta/
2019/12/04/inequality-climate-change-and-the-role-of-central-banks [https://perma.cc/DF64HFPJ]. The press recently began commenting on the increasing pressure to conscript central
banks into ancillary social issues, with varying opinions on the matter. Compare Editorial, The
Perils of Asking Central Banks To Do Too Much, ECONOMIST (Mar. 13, 2021),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2021/03/13/the-perils-of-asking-centralbanks-to-do-too-much [https://perma.cc/7GUR-KZAZ] (“[T]empting as it is to allow authority
to flow to those who use it well, adding to central-bank mandates poses both economic and
political risks.”), with Martin Wolf, Opinion, Monetary Financing Demands Careful and Sober
Management, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/dc233540-798e-11ea-98401b8019d9a987 [https://perma.cc/VG6Y-58B7] (urging that “exceptional circumstances” make
the “job of the central bank to support the overriding need for the state to protect people’s lives
and livelihood . . . [i]ts independence, while normally desirable, is a means to an end, not an end
in itself”). Further, as one former deputy governor of the Bank of England has recently remarked,
“Fifteen years ago, the world of central banking seemed sober, calm and apolitical. Since then the
financial crisis, euro meltdown and now Covid-19, together with persistently weak underlying
growth, have reinjected politics into central banking, creating dilemmas and tensions.” Paul
Tucker, Do We Need a New Constitution for Central Banking?, ECON. OBSERVATORY (Dec. 22,
2020), https://www.economicsobservatory.com/do-we-need-new-constitution-central-banking
[https://perma.cc/2PTC-MD4W].
5. See, e.g., Christina Parajon Skinner, Central Banks and Climate Change, 75 VAND. L.
REV. 1301, 1325 (2021) (describing the various powers of the Fed).
6. See HAROLD JAMES, MAKING A MODERN CENTRAL BANK 457 (2020) (remarking, at
the launch of this book, that tremendous social, economic, and political shock has put pressure
on the central bank to “multi-task”); see also Laura Alix, Pressure Mounts on U.S. Bank
Regulators To Stress Test for Climate Change, AM. BANKER (Sept. 20, 2020, 9:00 PM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/pressure-mounts-on-u-s-bank-regulators-to-stress-testfor-climate-change [https://perma.cc/8AR3-23GA] (discussing recommendations by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission that banks and other federal regulators should use
stress tests to anticipate the impact of climate change on the financial industry).
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Bank (“ECB”), has committed to doing “whatever we can” to fight
climate change;7 just as her predecessor, Mario Draghi, promised to do
“whatever it takes” to save the eurozone from the financial crisis—
conjuring images of Machiavelli and the Medici, not a rules-bound
institution.8 Patrick Honohan, former governor of the Bank of Ireland,
has likewise urged that “central banks have been behind the curve of
society’s response to these issues [like climate change and inequality]
and could make a worthwhile contribution in a number of respects.”9
Even former U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, has
extolled the virtues of an “activist central bank[]” as a means of
ensuring “our best days lie ahead.”10 Putting their words to action,
these various central banks have begun to engage in a range of actions
and experiments, earning themselves new pithy epithets—“central
bankers of the future”11 and central bankers of a “brave new world.”12

7. Editorial, Lagarde Does Whatever She Can, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2020, 10:21 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/lagarde-does-whatever-she-can-11607527307?mod=opinion_lead_pos4
[https://perma.cc/3X66-YDQB].
8. Mario Draghi, President, Eur. Cent. Bank, Speech at the Global Investment Conference
(July 26, 2012), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html [https://
perma.cc/5HGH-YD8A].
9. Patrick Honohan, Should Monetary Policy Take Inequality and Climate Change into
Account? 2 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 19-18, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3478285 [https://perma.cc/296M-LK4Q].
10. George Osborne, Opinion, How To Keep Proving the Economic Pessimists Wrong,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2014, 6:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/george-osborne-how-to-keepproving-the-economic-pessimists-wrong-1418600536 [https://perma.cc/3ZKV-KYHN].
11. Agustín Carstens, Gen. Manager, Bank of Int’l Settlements, Central Bankers of the
Future, Speech at the Deutsche Bundesbank’s Internal Discussion Series (Dec. 14, 2020),
https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp201214.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8EE-NBM9].
12. Balazs Koranyi & Francesco Canepa, Central Bankers Seek New Role in Brave New
World, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2020, 12:25 PM), https://reut.rs/35ei3LH [https://perma.cc/6LC4EJMP]; see Carola Conces Binder & Christina Parajon Skinner, Laboratories of Central Banking
33–44 (Aug. 9, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (empirically demonstrating
that Fed research departments have increasingly focused on topics like climate and inequality,
along lines of race and gender); see also The ECB’s Monetary Policy Strategy Statement, EUR.
CENT. BANK, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/search/review/html/ecb.strategyreview_monpol_
strategy_statement.en.html [https://perma.cc/545B-TD38] (“In addition to the comprehensive
incorporation of climate factors in its monetary policy assessments, the Governing Council will
adapt the design of its monetary policy operational framework in relation to disclosures, risk
assessment, corporate sector asset purchases and the collateral framework.”); Press Release,
Bank of England, Bank of England Publishes the Key Elements of the 2021 Biennial Exploratory
Scenario: Financial Risks from Climate Change (June 8, 2021), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
news/2021/june/key-elements-of-the-2021-biennial-exploratory-scenario-financial-risks-fromclimate-change [https://perma.cc/TS4A-GWTX] (announcing how the Bank will conduct a
scenario analysis and stress test “to explore the financial risks posed by climate change for the
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The Fed also faces considerable pressure to expand.13 Indeed,
some already see the Fed gradually succumbing to the pressure of
unprecedented times, using “incremental adaptions of the policy
instruments that are available” to accomplish new and larger aims.14
The Fed has long been committed to a rhetoric of apolitical
technocracy, but there is a growing chorus of media, commentators,
and scholars suggesting it would be “morally and ethically wrong for
central banks to . . . remain on the sidelines” of key social issues.15 But
such value judgments are for Congress, who has the constitutional
authority to specify the policy objectives that the Fed has authority to
pursue.16
Principally, the Federal Reserve Act mandates that the Fed
maintain price stability and maximum employment17 and gives the Fed
responsibility to act as “lender of last resort” to financial institutions in
distress.18 Other legislation requires the Fed to mind the “safety” and
largest UK banks and insurers”); Climate Change, BANK OF ENG., https://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/climate-change [https://perma.cc/N9FF-ECT6] (last updated Sept. 23,
2021) (discussing the Bank’s scenario analysis and stress testing as a part of its toolkit to address
climate change financial risk); NGFS Publications, NGFS, https://www.ngfs.net/en/listechronologique/ngfs-publications [https://perma.cc/DJ2H-JWDE] (listing NGFS publications,
dating back to 2018, pushing forward a broader climate-related research agenda).
13. See infra Part I.A. For a broad empirical treatment of central banks and political
pressure, see generally Carola Conces Binder, Political Pressure on Central Banks (Dec. 15, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3244148
[https://perma.cc/HL5M-CWMB] (analyzing whether central banks are likely to succumb to
political pressure).
14. Mohamed A. El-Erian, Evolution, Impact, and Limitations of Unusual Central Bank
Policy Activism, 103 FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 243, 258 (2012); see Peter Conti-Brown &
David A. Wishnick, Technocratic Pragmatism, Bureaucratic Expertise, and the Federal Reserve,
130 YALE L.J. 636, 636, 639–41 (2021) (urging that the Fed can address things like climate change,
the COVID-19 pandemic, and cyber risk under the umbrella of “technocratic pragmatism” which
allows “the Fed to develop the expertise necessary to address emergent problems as long as it
remains constrained by norms designed to preserve its long-run legitimacy”).
15. El-Erian, supra note 14; see supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See 12 U.S.C. § 225a.
18. Id. (price stability); id. § 343 (emergency lending to nonbank financial institutions); id. §
347b(a) (discount window). As will be later discussed, the original 13(2) power was not intended
as a LOLR power, in the contemporary sense of the term. See infra notes 20 and 39 and
accompanying text. Throughout the 1920s the Reserve Banks accepted eligible paper on demand,
using the discount rate to adjust demand. See infra notes 260–84 and accompanying text. The
philosophy behind the policy was grounded in the so-called real bills doctrine. See generally
Stanley Fischer, Vice Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., The Lender of Last
Resort Function in the United States, Address at a Committee on Capital Markets Regulations
Conference (Feb. 10, 2016) (transcript available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/
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“soundness” of financial institutions19 and to look after the stability of
the financial system overall.20 Neither the text nor purpose of this
legislation authorizes the Fed to redress problems associated with small
business, climate, or inequality—regardless of how important these
problems are today.21 They may well be issues for other branches of the
government, but strictly speaking, they are not problems for the Fed.
Yet central banks are often pressured to engage in “activism”
when their policy goals and tools—set out ex ante by the legislature—
fall short of some present economic problem. In principle, problems
that fall outside the predetermined perimeter of central bank policy
ought to be addressed by the elected legislature or executive, either
through direct action or explicit allocation of responsibility to the

newsevents/speech/files/fischer20160210a.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQ8H-YSRZ]) (highlighting
how “the Fed executed its lender-of-last-resort responsibility” from the Great Depression to the
Great Recession).
19. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(4).
20. While this is not an express mandate of the Federal Reserve, it seems implied by the
Dodd-Frank Act 2010. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, §§ 113(a), 161–176, 124 Stat. 1376, 1398, 1420–1442 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 5323, 5361–5374) (identifying the Board of Governors as the agency to supervise institutions
that “could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States” and providing the Board
with various new legal authorities to carry out the § 113 supervisory responsibility); BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 1 (2021),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20210506.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7YQB-8E5H] (“Promoting financial stability is a key element in meeting the
Federal Reserve’s dual mandate for monetary policy regarding full employment and stable
prices.”); Jerome Powell, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Press Conference 3 (July
28, 2021) (transcript available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/
FOMCpresconf20210728.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9QT-C47W]) (recognizing the Fed has
“responsibilities to promote the stability of the financial system”).
21. The so-called “real bills” doctrine, which significantly influenced the original Federal
Reserve Act, contended that monetary policy would become self-regulating if money supply was
tied to real economic activity, such that “as a matter of law . . . certain types of business credit
could always be converted into bank reserves.” Perry Mehrling, Economists and the Fed:
Beginnings, 16 J. ECON. PERSPS. 207, 210–13 (2002). Accordingly, section 14(d) of the original
Federal Reserve Act required that the Fed make policy “with a view of accommodating
commerce and business” and, in section 13(2), lend exclusively against “notes, drafts, and bills of
exchange issued or drawn for agricultural, industrial, or commercial purposes.” Federal Reserve
Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, §§ 13(2), 14(d), 38 Stat. 251, 263, 265 (1913) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 343, 357). However, the Fed abandoned the doctrine after its policy prescriptions led to
disastrous results during the Great Depression—therefore, it does not justify the Fed redressing
problems associated with small businesses today. For general history and discussion of the real
bills doctrine, see THOMAS M. HUMPHREY & RICHARD H. TIMBERLAKE, GOLD, THE REAL
BILLS DOCTRINE, AND THE FED: SOURCES OF MONETARY DISORDER, 1922–38 (2019); Jeffrey
M. Lacker, From Real Bills to Too Big To Fail: H. Parker Willis and the Fed’s First Century, 39
CATO J. 15, 17–18 (1999).
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central bank. But should they fail to do so, likely because of
insurmountable political frictions, central bankers may feel
exogenously pressured (by the public or other branches of the
government) or endogenously compelled (from factions within the
institution) to step in and flex some muscle.
The core claim of this Article is that when the Fed bends or
stretches its legal mandates to address social or economic problems of
the day (if and as they might emerge), it engages in “activism” that will
present problems for society on a number of dimensions. Each problem
will build upon the last; they are as follows:
First, and most plainly, central bank activism can be ultra vires.
Like all administrative agencies, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (the “Fed Board”) makes policy and regulation based
on authority delegated to it by the U.S. Congress. And, like all
agencies, it is required to act within the ambit of the legislative
authority it has been delegated; to go beyond what Congress has
permitted and asked it to do would be an unconstitutional assumption
of legislative authority.22 Congress first conceived the Fed as an
institution with a limited purpose in society; in 1913, the year of its
founding, the Fed was tasked with maintaining an elastic currency and
supervising its member banks.23 While the Fed’s legal purpose grew
throughout the twenty and twenty-first centuries, that growth was
always statutorily prescribed, not politically imposed or selfaggrandized.24 The Fed—although a unique institution in many
respects—is similar to other regulatory agencies insofar as its officials

22. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is axiomatic that
an administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority
delegated by Congress.”). The structure of the Constitution allocates power among three distinct
branches, with legislative power allocated to the legislative branch. See generally M.J.C. VILE,
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2d ed. 1998) (discussing the three
branches of government and the powers given to each).
23. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251, 251 (1913).
24. See generally SARAH BINDER & MARK SPINDEL, THE MYTH OF INDEPENDENCE: HOW
CONGRESS GOVERNS THE FEDERAL RESERVE 19 tbl.1.1 (2017) (tabling “Key Episodes of
Congressional Reform of the Fed, 1913-2015”).
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are unelected.25 In a democratic society, the Fed must be constrained
by Congress. Central bankers are not, after all, ‘philosopher kings.’26
Second, central bank activism alters the balance of power between
the Fed, the executive branch, and Congress. This can happen in a
number of ways. Most generally, whenever the Fed enlarges the scope
of its own authority, it assumes power from Congress to define the
Fed’s role while simultaneously undermining Congress’s ability to hold
the Fed accountable. Insofar as the Fed engages in credit allocation or
monetary finance, for example, it acts in place of power that is more
properly exercised by the fiscal authority of the Treasury. And, to the
extent the Fed reacts to popular (and presidential) pressure for new or
increased action, it enlarges the power of the presidency to influence
the policy of the Fed—something Fed chairs have fought against since
1913.27
Third, activism invites political interference which may undermine
the Fed’s autonomy and perhaps its independence.28 Independence
from political pressure is generally recognized as critical to the Fed’s
ability to effectively transmit policy. In order to be effective at
anchoring inflation expectations, for example, central banks have to be
able to credibly commit to pursuing low inflation. But because
politicians, seeking short-term gains in popularity, tend to want a ‘hot
economy,’ politicians can inevitably be counted upon to try to pressure
the Fed into keeping interest rates low, even if that means increased
inflation down the road. A norm against political interference in this
regard allows the Fed to commit to price stability without skepticism
about its ability to remain stalwart. The Fed needs a widespread norm
of independence because it is the steward of price stability in our
25. For a thorough treatment on the legitimacy of central bank power, see generally PAUL
TUCKER, UNELECTED POWER: THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY IN CENTRAL BANKING AND THE
REGULATORY STATE (2018).
26. See Grant Wilson, Opinion, The Limits of Central Bank Activism May Finally Be in
Sight, FIN. REV. (Nov. 29, 2020, 3:32 PM), https://www.afr.com/markets/debt-markets/the-limitsof-central-bank-activism-may-finally-be-sight-20201129-p56iwb [https://perma.cc/TQU6-N3EA].
The notion of a philosopher king, an all-knowing, benevolent ruler, “handing down wisdom” to
citizens and officials, was theorized by Plato. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 175–256.
27. See Michael Salib & Christina Parajon Skinner, Executive Override of Central Banks: A
Comparison of the Legal Frameworks in the United States and the United Kingdom, 108 GEO. L.J.
905, 905, 957–68 (2020).
28. For a general treatment of Fed independence, see PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER
AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 2–3, 179–80 (2016). But see BINDER &
SPINDEL, supra note 24, at 4–5, 10–11, 16–18 (pointing out that, despite its now revered status in
the popular mind, independence is far from absolute).
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economy. But forward-leaning interpretations of its mandate, that
suggest it to be politicized, will erode that norm. Damage to Fed
independence can lead society down a very slippery slope. If beholden
to political beliefs, the Fed will soon find itself in the business of
restricting or redirecting dollars in the economy depending on which
group or industries are in or out of political favor. Such practice is
anathema to a market economy in a democratic society.
For all of these reasons, there is much at stake in seeing activism
plainly—and actively debating it. Public understanding of and
discourse around central bank activism makes a subterranean
“transformation of the state”—which some central bank watchers are
predicting—more difficult to accomplish.29 It also may, in turn, place
the onus on Congress to act through legislation and modify the duties
of the Fed, should society demand it.
This Article begins that debate by creating a novel framework for
viewing and understanding central bank activism. It offers a descriptive
account of central bank activism, conceptualizing activism in terms of
both current and historic episodes of activism. This Article also offers
a normative account of activism, exploring the dangers of this behavior
to the U.S. economy and its democracy. Finally, it makes suggestions
for how to constrain activism while, at the same time, allowing for a
central bank that is modern, adaptive, and agile.
To that end, this Article proceeds in three parts. The first Part
examines various examples of central bank activism. How do we
recognize central bank activism and set it apart from lawful policy
maneuvering and application? Part I first offers a working definition of
activism; it then explains the bases for that definition by considering
the three arenas in which the Fed is or has been called on to engage in
activism—in managing the global financial and economic crises of 2008
and 2020; in mitigating climate change; and in redressing wealth and
income inequality. Without a doubt, these are all extremely important
problems for society to solve—but to what extent are they problems
that the Fed can undertake without damage to the rule of law and the
efficacy of the central bank?
Part II gives more descriptive context by studying past episodes in
history when the Fed has engaged in activism. This Part considers three
examples in U.S. history where central bank activism occurred and
draws out lessons learned. The first example involves the First and
29. See Wilson, supra note 26 (predicting an unnoticed transformation of the role of
government).
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Second Banks of the United States, America’s earliest efforts at a
central bank. Activist efforts in institutional design—fashioning a bank
that would mix public and private functions in ways that facilitated
credit allocation—doomed the Banks to popular resentment and
ultimately Andrew Jackson’s veto. The second example involves
various activist endeavors of the Fed during the 1920s, largely under
the leadership of the New York Federal Reserve Bank. That Reserve
Bank’s president, Benjamin Strong, pursued a policy objective of price
stability long before Congress had given the Federal Reserve System a
mandate to do so; Strong also set discount rate policy to help a foreign
ally. The third example is from the 1970s, when the Fed’s focus on price
stability became blurred. Instead, it attended to more politically
palatable objectives, like prodding up employment. This resulted in an
uncontrolled period of “Great Inflation,” which inflicted significant
macroeconomic pain. On the whole, Part II shows that activism is not
a new phenomenon and is never without costs.
Part III answers the key normative question: Why worry (much)
about central banking activism? For many, questions of activism fall in
the gray. After all, if a central bank lacks the positive legal authority to
engage in “green quantitative easing,” but can use its policy tools to
push the world towards a better climate equilibrium—would that be
‘so bad’? Are there trade-offs worth accepting? While intoxicating to
consider, it is a dangerous slippery slope that governments have slid
down too fast before. Long-term costs usually outweigh the gains. For
one, opening the door to ultra vires action—where ends may justify the
means—can damage the Fed’s legitimacy and independence. That
damage translates to a less effective Fed—one that misallocates
resources and can neither stymie economic crises nor buoy the
economy. Moreover, overreliance on the Fed might provide just a
temporary fix while obscuring the responsibilities of other institutions
that should be taking action.
Still, nuance is important. It is practical to evaluate activism along
a spectrum insofar as the Fed must have some leeway to modernize and
react to emergent crises, while hewing closely to the rule of law. The
legitimacy of activism may well vary, in this way, depending upon:
(1) how explicit the legal authority is to address a particular problem;
(2) how much expertise the Fed has with respect to that problem; and
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(3) how strong the mechanisms for accountability are.30 Accordingly,
the final Part of this Article sketches out a framework that the Fed (or
Congress) might use to ensure that newly pursued policy initiatives
constitute in-bounds adaptations or agility maneuvers—not poweraggrandizing activism—and that the public understands as much.
Ultimately, this Article aims to generate public discourse
surrounding the legitimate role of the Fed in our society.31 Inasmuch as
contemporary social and political pressures stand to fundamentally
reshape the Fed, they have also thrown up critical questions core to a
society founded on the rule of law and those that pertain to the scope,
and power, of the administrative state. By stimulating that debate, this
Article may also muster more attention to the need for Congress to
reconsider the necessary and proper authority of the Federal Reserve
in the United States today.
I. WHAT IS CENTRAL BANK ‘ACTIVISM’?
How do we recognize central bank activism, and under what
conditions does it occur? Answering that question is the focus of this
Part. As the following case studies will show, central bank activism can
arise in response to economic problems that require solutions that sit
beyond or outside the Fed’s legal mandates. Often, because these
problems feel acute, political and popular pressure will build on the
central bank to expand its policy tools beyond what the letter or spirit
of the law admits and allows.32
To illustrate the concept, this Part considers three examples of
contemporary activism. The first example involves the Fed’s expansion

30. In this regard, this Article reinforces the work of those scholars like Professors Peter
Conti-Brown and David Wishnick that seek to develop paradigms to help the Fed “navigate the
tension” between popular demands to aggrandize power, on the one hand, and the need to avoid
forays into “resolutely ‘political problems,’” on the other. See Conti-Brown & Wishnick, supra
note 14, at 639.
31. As Paul Tucker has surmised, it is now time for “[w]idespread vigilance and awareness
of subtle but cumulative attempts to repoliticise central banking to service sectional interests—
what is cheered today might bring tears tomorrow.” Tucker, supra note 4.
32. Although this Article confines its study to central banks, activism among administrative
agencies is not unique to the Fed. In recent months, commentators have also remarked on
activism at the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). Editorial, A Case of Blindside Regulation,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11, 2021, 6:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-case-of-blindside-regulation11610407907?mod=opinion_lead_pos3 [https://perma.cc/9AZH-K4JD] (“Congress has
empowered the FTC to prevent, prohibit and punish ‘unfair or deceptive’ business practices. The
Federal Trade Commission Act doesn’t define these terms, so the FTC is supposed to know them
when it sees them. The agency increasingly sees them wherever it looks.”).
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of its “lender of last resort” (“LOLR”) authority in the past ten years.
The second two examples are presently hypothetical, but potentially
imminent—they consider the pressure and potential for the Fed to
engage in climate or redistributional policy.
Collectively, these three cases shed light on activism’s main
hallmarks: the rise of some tension between legal text and purpose or
historic usage, on the one hand, and an economic policy problem on
the other, which creates pressure on the central bank to take or evolve
a legal power outside the legislative process. In addition, activism
threatens to upset some structural dynamics, either by: (1) reallocating
power between the Fed, Congress, and the Executive Branch (i.e., the
Treasury); (2) creating an opening for new or increased political
pressure going forward; or (3) making value judgments that are
otherwise reserved for elected officials in the political branches.
Ultimately, the various cases of present and past activism fall along
different points on a spectrum of legitimacy, which will be considered
in Part III.
A. Lender of Last Resort
The first example of central bank activism involves one of the
Fed’s core historic roles—its responsibility to act as a LOLR to
financial institutions and the financial system during periods of crisis or
emergency.33 The basic notion of a central bank as LOLR is that, in
situations of market turmoil, the central bank should step in and lend
“freely,” but only to solvent institutions and at a penalty rate.34 This is
famously known as Bagehot’s dictum, named for Walter Bagehot, the
so-called father of central banking.35
There are several provisions of the Federal Reserve Act that
empower the Fed to act as a LOLR. One, authorized by section 10B of
the Federal Reserve Act, is known as the “discount window” and was

33. See Thomas M. Humphrey, Lender of Last Resort: The Concept in History, FED. RSRV.
BANK RICHMOND ECON. REV., Mar.–Apr. 1989, at 8, 8.
34. See WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET
23, 25, 97 (1873).
35. See Ben S. Bernanke, Fed Emergency Lending, BROOKINGS (Dec. 3, 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2015/12/03/fed-emergency-lending [https://
perma.cc/P9QH-MT9P] (discussing how Bagehot’s dictum influences the Fed). Notably, there
are many references to Bagehot in the 1913 Federal Reserve Act congressional records. See, e.g.,
51 CONG. REC. 667 (1913) (statement of Sen. Burton).
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added to the Federal Reserve Act in February 1932.36 Section 10B
provides that “[a]ny Federal Reserve bank . . . may make advances to
any member bank on its time or demand notes having maturities of not
more than four months and which are secured to the satisfaction of
such Federal Reserve bank.”37 Pursuant to that authority, Federal
Reserve Banks can make loans to depository institutions that are part
of the Federal Reserve System.38
Congress designed section 10B with financial and economic
emergencies in mind.39 For context, Congress added 10B to the Federal
Reserve Act in the midst of the tremendous economic hardship of the
Great Depression (in the Glass-Steagall Act), mainly in order to give
banks the confidence they needed to continue lending despite the
uncertain times.40 Indeed, reflecting on that era, former Fed General

36. Act of Feb. 27, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-44, § 10(a), 47 Stat. 56, 56 (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. § 347b(a)); Discount Window Lending, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/discount-window.htm [https://perma.cc/76DD-W7X2]
(last updated June 30, 2021) (“[T]he ‘discount window’[] plays an important role in supporting
the liquidity and stability of the banking system and the effective implementation of monetary
policy.”). This provision was added by emergency legislation in 1932, and the Glass-Steagall Act
(also known as the Banking Act of 1933) made it a permanent fixture, with some amendments, to
the Federal Reserve Act. See Anna J. Schwartz, The Misuse of the Fed’s Discount Window, 74
FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 59, 60 (1992).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 347b(a).
38. There is other federal law that gives state nonmember banks and thrifts access to the
Fed’s discount window. See PETER CONTI-BROWN & DAVID SKEEL, USING THE FEDERAL
RESERVE’S DISCOUNT WINDOW FOR DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION FINANCING DURING THE
COVID-19 BANKRUPTCY CRISIS 8 (2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2020/07/Conti-Brown-Skeel.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT8S-4T8T] (“After the passage of the
Monetary Control Act of 1980, any depository institution can access the Fed’s discount
window.”).
39. These eligible institutions can borrow from the discount window at any time, but in
practice banks tend to limit their discount window borrowing to emergency situations only to
avoid a stigma associated with resorting to the Fed for help. See The Discount Window, FED.
RSRV. BANK OF N.Y. (July 2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed18.html
[https://perma.cc/SU52-2SF4]; HUBERTO M. ENNIS & DAVID A. PRICE, NO. EB20-04,
UNDERSTANDING DISCOUNT WINDOW STIGMA 1 (2020), https://www.richmondfed.org//media/RichmondFedOrg/publications/research/economic_brief/2020/pdf/eb_20-04.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CLW4-VDGP].
40. See HOWARD H. HACKLEY, LENDING FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS:
A HISTORY 100–01 (1973) (“The Glass-Steagall Act was essentially an emergency measure . . . .
[d]esigned to correct the abuses that had led to the unhappy days [of the Great Depression].”).
As further proof that 10B was designed with emergencies in mind, the original bill imposed
various conditions on accessing the discount window, including a penalty rate of interest,
exigencies required, and a demonstration that the bank could not access credit elsewhere. Id. at
105–08.
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Counsel Howard Hackley once remarked that the creation of the
discount window was “largely psychological”:
it gives assurance to these frightened and timid bankers throughout
the country that if they will only respond to the requirements of
commerce, if they will only help in relieving themselves and the
country from this depression and in doing so exhaust their eligible
assets, then and only then may they make use of their ineligible
assets.41

Congress displayed similar motivation when it expanded the Fed’s
LOLR powers to other kinds of institutions by adding section 13(3) in
July 1932.42 The addition of 13(3) made it possible for the Reserve
Banks to lend to “individual[s], partnership[s], [and] corporation[s],”
not just member banks.43 But such loans had to be “strictly limited”44
to “unusual and exigent” circumstances.45 To cabin 13(3), Congress
narrowed the kind of paper acceptable for discount more than it had
under 10B.46 Additionally, the statute gave permission for further
conditioning by giving the Fed Board power to issue rules concerning
the parameters by which Reserve banks would be allowed to make
13(3) loans.47 Taking Congress up on that invitation, a July 26, 1932
circular set out even stricter terms than the text of the statute had: it
required that the Reserve Banks demand a statement from each
applicant seeking 13(3) assistance explaining the purposes for which
the loan proceeds would be used and the efforts the borrower had
made to obtain credit elsewhere first, from other financial

41. Id. at 101.
42. Act of July 21, 1932, ch. 520, § 210, 47 Stat. 709, 715 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §
343). As will be discussed, two years later, the Industrial Advances Act added section 13(b) to the
Federal Reserve Act, which, during the 1930s and 40s, became a much more active lending
program. See Industrial Advances Act, Pub. L. No. 73-417, 48 Stat. 1105, 1105 (1934); infra notes
130–34 and accompanying text.
43. § 210, 47 Stat. at 715.
44. HACKLEY, supra note 40, at 128.
45. § 210, 47 Stat. at 715. There were other limiting conditions imposed at the time: five
members of the Board had to vote in favor of the loan and could limit the duration of the
assistance. HACKLEY, supra note 40, at 128.
46. See HACKLEY, supra note 40, at 128.
47. See 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A) (“All such discounts for any participant in any program or
facility with broad-based eligibility shall be subject to such limitations, restrictions, and
regulations as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may prescribe.”).
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institutions.48 Again, this all shows that the purpose of 13(3) was
foremost for emergency, “to provide needed credit to business
concerns and individuals,” and for sparing use.49
Section 13 has been amended several times since its original
passage. Two separate legislative changes in the 1930s relaxed
eligibility requirements in section 13 to facilitate emergency lending by
the Reserve Banks. In 1933, Congress added section 13(13) to the
Federal Reserve Act, which allowed the Reserve Banks to make
ninety-day advances to individuals, partnerships, or corporations.50
This provision did not contain language of exigency per se, but political
and legislative context suggests that it was intended to supplement
section 13(3); at the time, 13(3) authority for Reserve Bank discounting
was limited to so-called real bills.51 Section 13(13), in contrast, would
allow for short-term advances (loans) secured by a broader set of
collateral, U.S. treasury securities.52 The Banking Act of 1935 would
later relax the requirements for discounting in section 13(3) itself by
removing a requirement that the borrower provides both an

48. HACKLEY, supra note 40, at 129–30. This would include description of all of the
borrower’s banking relationships maintained over the past year. Id.
49. Id. at 129. But not many nonbanks would have the necessary commercial paper to
discount. Id. Notably, firms with a bank charter who are not subject to reserve requirements are
not eligible for ordinary lending, even if they are member banks. Cf. Discount Window Programs
Participation
and
Pledging
Guide,
FED.
RSRV.
BANK
OF
S.F.,
https://www.frbsf.org/banking/discount-window/banking/files/Discount-Window-ProgramsParticipation-Pledging-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9KT-5LKJ] (“By law, depository
institutions that maintain reservable transaction accounts or nonpersonal time deposits (as
defined in Regulation D) generally may establish a borrowing relationship at the Discount
Window.”).
50. Emergency Banking Act of Mar. 9, 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-1, sec. 403, 48 Stat. 1, 7.
Although 13(13) does not contain language restricting it to emergencies, its ninety-day proviso
suggests it envisions short-term liquidity problems apropos of emergency; the emergency-styled
legislation is also telling context.
51. See Parinitha Sastry, The Political Origins of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act,
FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Sept. 2018, at 1, 21–26. The real bills doctrine had been hard-wired
into the original Federal Reserve Act in, for example, section 13(2). The provision excludes
“notes, drafts, or bills covering merely investments or issued or drawn for the purpose of carrying
or trading in stocks, bonds, or other investment securities, except bonds and notes of the
government of the United States” from being eligible for discounts by reserve banks. 12 U.S.C. §
343. The authority for the present-day discount window, section 10B, would not be added until
1932. See supra note 36.
52. Sec. 402, 48 Stat. 7; see Sastry, supra note 51, at 25.
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“endorsement” and collateral that was satisfactory to the Reserve
Bank (from then on it would be one or the other).53
In 1991, Congress loosened the collateral requirements of 13(3)
more significantly—no longer would a 13(3) borrower need to supply
collateral that was as good or better than what would otherwise be
eligible for discount under section 13(2) (i.e., supply a real bill).54
Collateral could henceforth be “secured to the satisfaction of the
Federal reserve bank.”55 Section 13(3) was amended yet again in 2010,
as part of the Dodd-Frank Act.56 That time, Congress made it more
difficult for the Reserve Banks to lend selectively under 13(3)—it gave
Treasury a veto over such facilities and required that all 13(3)
assistance be delivered through facilities “with broad-based
eligibility.”57
As this historical tour around section 13 should make plain,
Congress generally intended and expressed section 13 to be robust in
times of crisis, but not without restraint. Between 1932 and the present
day, Congress understood section 13 as a vehicle for assistance specific
to “individuals, corporations, or partnerships” in the business
community; confined to emergency situations or of a time-limited
nature; and for the purpose of easing liquidity conditions in the

53. Act of Aug. 23, 1935, ch. 614, § 322, 49 Stat. 684, 714 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 343). This amendment was significant:
The process of endorsement aims to provide the Bank with a measure of protection
against loss. When a party unqualifiedly endorses commercial paper, it assumes
secondary liability on that paper. Following endorsement, the Bank can bring a claim
against the endorser in the event that the issuer of the paper does not pay.
Alexander Mehra, Legal Authority in Unusual and Exigent Circumstances: The Federal Reserve
and the Financial Crisis, U. PA. J. BUS. L. 221, 228–29 (2010) (emphasis omitted) (footnotes
omitted).
54. Act of Dec. 19, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, tit. IV, § 473, 105 Stat. 2286, 2386. While other
constraints remained in place, no longer would collateral need to be “of the kinds and maturities
made eligible for discount for member banks.” Id.
55. Id.; see also Colleen M. Baker, The Federal Reserve As Collateral’s Last Resort, 96
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1397–98 (2021) (discussing collateral requirements in connection
with LOLR).
56. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
1101(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2113 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 343).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 343. That is, 13(3) requires any lending facilities to be structured to render
eligibility to a class of institutions rather than as a loan to any one individual, partnership, or
corporation. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Board
Approves Final Rule Specifying Its Procedures for Emergency Lending Under Section 13(3) of
the Federal Reserve Act (Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
pressreleases/bcreg20151130a.htm [https://perma.cc/C5PF-72T3].
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financial system.58 Since 2008, active interpretations of section 13(3)
have expanded its scope beyond those key parameters.59
1. Asset Purchases. As part of its crisis-fighting role, the Fed has
expanded its use of 13(3) to support asset markets—a seeming
departure from the more traditional use of 13(3), which is aimed at
providing liquidity to individuals or institutions.60
The original Federal Reserve Act empowered the Fed to buy
assets in the open market under section 14 of that Act.61 In normal
times, the Fed uses this authority to engage in so-called open market
operations (“OMOs”) to effectuate monetary policy. OMOs affect the
supply of reserves, which in turn impacts the federal funds rates and
then other prevailing market rates.62 The global financial crisis of 2008
58. An open question is municipalities, which are corporations, not sovereigns. See, e.g.,
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-N (2021). Likely, the Fed has not lent to municipalities because of
the credit risk analysis (and politicization) that would attend such lending. Lev Menand, The
Federal Reserve and the 2020 Economic and Financial Crisis, 24 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 295, 319–
320 (2021); see also Beth LeBlanc, Fed Chief Rejects Tlaib’s Push To Lend to Distressed Cities
Like Detroit, DETROIT NEWS (Feb. 12, 2020, 2:13 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/
story/news/politics/2020/02/12/tlaib-pushes-federal-reserve-lend-distressed-cities/4737801002
[https://perma.cc/28M2-4AKJ] (reporting that, in response to Representative Tlaib’s urging the
Fed to lend more freely to distressed cities, states, and territories like Detroit and Puerto Rico,
Chair Powell replied, “What I believe is that that’s not a job for the Fed . . . . The Fed has a
particular role and particular authorities, and lending to state and local governments and
supporting them when they’re in bankruptcy, that’s not part of our mandate”).
59. To preview, descriptively, what follows does fit the concept of activism; normatively,
however, I accept LOLR activism as both desirable and inevitable, as will be discussed below. See
infra Part III.
60. The observation that the Fed seems ready to rescue markets became known colloquially
as the “Greenspan Put.” See Sandeep Dahiya, Bardia Kamrad, Valerio Poti & Akhtar Siddique,
The Greenspan Put 2 (Jan. 9, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2993326
[https://perma.cc/47AF-FLKH].
61. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 14, 38 Stat. 251, 264 (1913) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 353) (empowering Reserve Banks to conduct open market operations).
The reader should note that the Federal Open Market Committee (“FOMC”) has a separate legal
existence from the Board of Governors. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 77-66, § 8, 48 Stat. 162,
168 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 263) (creating and authorizing the FOMC). For more
detailed explanation of how the FOMC conducts monetary policy, see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RSRV. SYS., FUNCTION: CONDUCTING MONETARY POLICY 32–38 (2017),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/pf_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS75-SX9Y].
62. See Laura Hopper, What Are Open Market Operations? Monetary Policy Tools,
Explained, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.stlouisfed.org/openvault/2019/august/open-market-operations-monetary-policy-tools-explained [https://perma.cc/N7XXK22S]; Effective Federal Funds Rate, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://fred.
stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS [https://perma.cc/2GU9-AJHL] (last updated June 1, 2021).
Post-2008, the Fed adjusts the interest rate that banks earn on their reserves (“IOR”)—an
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exposed the limits of the Fed’s traditional interest rate policy tools to
stymie financial crisis,63 driving the Fed to think about asset purchases
on a large scale as a new kind of emergency crisis-fighting measure.64
To that end, the Fed (like other central banks) resorted to
“unconventional” monetary policy tools65 such as quantitative easing
(“QE”).66 The purpose of QE is to ease market conditions in the
moment, and then to generally lower medium- and long-term interest
administered rate—to “nudge” the market-determined federal funds rate (because, today, the
Fed has opted to remain in an “ample” reserve environment thus rendering slightly moot its prior
efforts to affect the amount of reserves as a means of influencing the money supply). For an
explanation of these frameworks, see generally Jane Ihrig & Scott Wolla, How Does the Fed
Influence Interest Rates Using Its New Tools, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2020/august/how-does-fed-influence-interest-rates-usingnew-tools [https://perma.cc/H9ZX-R2CL]. The reader may also be interested to know that the
Fed switched from borrowed reserves targets (M1 targeting) to federal funds rate targeting
sometime in the 1980s. See Daniel L. Thornton, When Did the FOMC Begin Targeting the Federal
Funds Rate? What the Verbatim Transcripts Tell Us 1–3 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, Working
Paper No. 2004-015, 2005), https://s3.amazonaws.com/real.stlouisfed.org/wp/2004/2004-015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AF7T-SETE].
63. During this period, the Fed dropped interest rates to close to zero in December 2008
(for the first time in decades) but without sufficient effect. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RSRV. SYS., MINUTES OF THE FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE OF DECEMBER 15–16, 2008,
at 9 (2008) [hereinafter DECEMBER 15–16, 2008, FOMC MEETING], https://
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20081216.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9SKL-XX5C]; Glenn D. Rudebusch, A Review of the Fed’s Unconventional Monetary Policy,
FED. RSRV. BANK OF S.F. (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/el201827.pdf [https://perma.cc/73 GK-5HM7].
64. Christopher J. Waller & Lowell R. Ricketts, The Rise and (Eventual) Fall in the Fed’s
Balance Sheet, REG’L ECONOMIST (Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/
regional-economist/january-2014/the-rise-and-eventual-fall-in-the-feds-balance-sheet [https://
perma.cc/2V8V-JUST]. Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act was intended to give Reserve
Banks authority to purchase government and agency-sponsored debt in the open market so as to
affect the amount of money in circulation, that is, as part of ordinary monetary policy operations.
See 12 U.S.C. § 353. The global financial crisis was the first time the Fed committed so much of
its balance sheet to emergency asset purchases. Waller & Ricketts, supra (stating that successive
rounds of QE “expanded the Fed balance sheet by close to $3 trillion from December 2007 to
November 2013[, a] . . . figure [that] is nearly four times the prerecession average”).
65. Rudebusch, supra note 63; see also Honohan, supra note 9 (“To contain the
consequences of the crisis, central banks began to rely on a much wider range of tools than had
been in recent use.”).
66. Together with forward guidance, the Fed adopted QE as an “unconventional” monetary
policy to supplement its interest rate moves (which were now, by default, the Fed’s
“conventional” monetary policy). See DECEMBER 15–16, 2008, FOMC MEETING, supra note 63.
For a summary of how QE, in certain forms, could evolve into activism, see generally Oral
Evidence: Quantitative Easing Before the HL Select Comm. on Econ. Affs., 2019–21 (2021)
(statement of Christina Parajon Skinner, Assistant Professor of Legal Studies & Business Ethics,
The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania), https://committees.parliament.uk/
oralevidence/2015/pdf [https://perma.cc/LX2B-KEG6].
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rates.67 The Fed also relied on QE in 2020, in response to the COVID19 pandemic and ensuing market panic.68 While QE has been billed as
“unconventional,” nothing in the text of section 14 prohibits the Fed
from undertaking this manner of policy.69
More recent extensions of 13(3) into certain asset markets may be
a grayer area.70 In March 2020, the Fed relied on that LOLR authority
to purchase corporate bonds and corporate bond exchange traded
funds (“ETFs”).71 It did not characterize its authority for these bond
purchases under section 14 (as QE is done), but rather, as liquidity
assistance, under section 13(3).72
67. The Fed expands its balance sheet by buying assets in the open market—in contrast to
usual OMOs, however, which target the federal funds rate, and thus the short-term interest rate,
see Open Market Operations, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/
aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed32.html [https://perma.cc/5E2T-QG3G], the QE aims to impact the
medium-term interest rate, see Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, The Effects
of Quantitative Easing on Interest Rates: Channels and Implications for Policy, BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2011, at 215, 215–16 https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/2011b_bpea_krishnamurthy.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7KD-GPHK].
68. According to a March 2020 press release,
[t]o support the smooth functioning of markets for Treasury securities and agency
mortgage-backed securities that are central to the flow of credit to households and
businesses, over coming months the Committee will increase its holdings of Treasury
securities by at least $500 billion and its holdings of agency mortgage-backed securities
by at least $200 billion.
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement
(Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200315a.htm
[https://perma.cc/KLR4-XUDT]. At a March 15, 2020 press conference, Chair Powell announced
that the Fed would commence asset purchases, to complement its other liquidity interventions, in
an effort to “support liquidity and return to normal function.” He noted that “the asset purchase
programs . . . are designed to restore those key markets [Treasury and MBS] to normal function.”
Jerome Powell, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv., Press Conference Call (Mar. 15,
2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20200315.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E36W-PDJ7].
69. Notably, Section 14 authorizes various kinds of open market operations (with Treasury
securities, cable transfers, etc.) as well as discount rate setting with no regard to end goal—so
“scope of section 14” has nothing to do with monetary policy vs. LOLR, conventional vs.
unconventional policies. See Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 14, 38 Stat. 251, 264 (1913)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 353–354, 357).
70. See Menand, supra note 58, at 300. As some have pointed out, aspects of asset-purchases
such as liquidity assistance had some precedent in “the global financial crisis.” See J. Nellie Liang,
Corporate Bond Market Dysfunction During COVID-19 and Lessons from the Fed’s Response 11
(Hutchins Ctr., Working Paper No. 69, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2020/10/WP69-Liang_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HH2-5APA].
71. Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV.
SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/smccf.htm [https://perma.cc/RV9J-77J5].
72. Id.; FAQs: Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility and Secondary Market Corporate
Credit Facility, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/primary-and-
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A section 13(3) justification for asset purchases—for fighting
crisis—probably better matches the policy purpose of the Fed’s 2020
action than a section 14 justification would have. Nevertheless, that
interpretation of section 13(3) may well have expanded its breadth
beyond the traditional discounting of “notes, drafts, and bills of
exchange” to eligible participants who are “unable to secure adequate
credit accommodations from other banking institutions.”73 After all,
the text of 13(3) does not expressly authorize the Fed to buy private
corporate bonds (or bond ETFs) as these 2020 programs did.74 The
corporate bond facilities depended, it would seem, on an interpretation
of 13(3) that presumes equivalence between buying a corporate bond
and discounting a note (or some other eligible collateral). And to be
fair, such interpretation does square with 13(3)’s original purpose,
namely, to provide liquidity assistance to members of the business
community. Consequently, while these new actions stretched the text
and purpose of 13(3), they did not go out of bounds.
Still, these novel bond facilities may be a ghost of activism yet to
come. If bond purchase programs in the future were ever to become
too large or too prolonged (that is, if assets are not removed from the
central bank balance sheet promptly, with maturities run-off or sold
back into the open market), the Fed could slip into a debt monetization

secondary-market-faq/corporate-credit-facility-faq [https://perma.cc/ZL5E-HS8L]. In contrast,
the QE undertaken after 2008 involved, for the most part, the purchase of Treasuries and agency
mortgaged-backed securities. Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, supra note 67, at 215, 217.
73. 12 U.S.C. § 343. To be clear, this Article does not suggest that lending to nonbanks under
§ 13(3) was a form of activism. Those actions were squarely within the realm of the Fed’s authority
under that provision.
74. In similar fashion, other 13(3) facilities were stood up to support money markets,
commercial paper, and other asset-backed securities. Menand, supra note 58, at 310–11, 315–16,
325. Accordingly, somewhat afield from 13(3)’s language aimed at businesses and individuals,
13(3) was deployed in 2020 (as it had also been in 2008) as LOLR for asset classes (corporate
bonds was a new, 2020, addition). See id. at 326 & n.119. For a fuller discussion of the Fed’s
authority in 2020 lending facilities, grouping and categorizing the Fed’s 2020 lending facilities as
authorized or unauthorized, see id. at 303–24.
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role.75 (This point holds true for QE programs under section 14 as
well.76)
Debt monetization refers to situations in which newly ‘printed’
money pays for new government spending.77 Not surprisingly, central
banks are not supposed to do this for reasons relating to inflation and
the central bank’s independence.78 To go down such a path would be a
return to a bygone era when the Treasury dominated the Fed to
precisely such an end. As Fed historian Allan Meltzer wrote, during
World War I, “the Treasury’s financial demands controlled monetary
policy.”79
A brief reflection on that period is instructive. In 1917, Secretary
of the Treasury Carter Glass notified the Federal Reserve that the
government wanted to float wartime bonds “at a rate well below the

75. After all, there is no meaningful difference between large-scale “liquidity” purchases
continuing into perpetuity (how can there even be a permanent liquidity crisis?) and direct debt
monetization. This applies to the purchase of both corporate and Treasury securities. See
GEORGE SELGIN, THE MENACE OF FISCAL QE 1 n.1 (2020) (using the term “‘fiscal QE’ to refer
to . . . any large-scale central bank asset purchases undertaken not for strictly macroeconomic
purposes but for the sake of either propping up particular firms or markets or funding particular
government programs”). As Ben Bernanke has described the practice, “[m]onetizing the debt
means using money creation as a permanent source of financing for government spending.” Ben
Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Bd., Five Questions About the Federal
Reserve and Monetary Policy, Address at the Economic Club of Indiana, Indianapolis (Oct. 1,
2012), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20121001a.htm [https://
perma.cc/7D7K-JM95]. For a straightforward explanation of debt monetization, see Ben Holland,
How Long-Feared ‘Monetary Finance’ Becomes Mainstream: QuickTake, BLOOMBERG (May 5,
2020, 11:54 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-05/how-long-fearedmonetary-finance-becomes-mainstream-quicktake [https://perma.cc/9JKJ-YL26].
76. See generally ECON. AFFS. COMM., QE: A DANGEROUS ADDICTION? 2021–22, HL 42
(UK) (discussing the risk of debt financing associated with very long—or too prolonged—QE
programs).
77. Holland, supra note 75.
78. See Jose A. Lopez & Kris James Mitchener, Uncertainty and Hyperinflation: European
Inflation Dynamics After World War I, at 1 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 2018-06,
2018), https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/wp2018-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/69GQKVFX]. Countries that historically used debt monetization—1920s Germany, Austria, Poland,
and Hungary, for example—saw severe inflation as a result of those war-financing induced
policies. See id. at 1–2. The United States also flirted with debt monetization after World War II
when it agreed to keep interest rates artificially low to help facilitate the market for U.S.
Treasuries. See Salib & Skinner, supra note 27, at 960–63 (discussing the impact on postwar debt
monetization and Fed independence from the Treasury).
79. 1 ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE: 1913–1951, at 16
(2003).

SKINNER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

CENTRAL BANK ACTIVISM

10/22/2021 9:59 AM

269

market.”80 The Fed accommodated the government’s wishes by
maintaining such favorable financing conditions for bond purchasers.81
Eventually, the Treasury’s financing needs obstructed the Fed’s
objectives. When the president of the New York Fed, Benjamin Strong,
sought to raise interest rates in 1919 to fend off inflation, Treasury
Secretary Glass threatened to ask the sitting U.S. president to remove
Strong from office.82
The Fed was again pressed into a similar position in the run-up to
World War II. The Fed agreed to maintain an interest rate peg that
would help the government’s bond sales, which hamstrung its ability to
set monetary policy against inflation.83 The Fed attributes the
subsequent postwar bout of inflation to this money financing
arrangement, noting that surging price levels were only reined in after
the rate peg was phased out in 1951.84
For now, the Fed appears resistant to slipping into monetary
finance—the perception as much as the practice.85 The 13(3) corporate
bond facilities have been in runoff mode since December 2020, and the
Fed seems committed to soon scaling back (even ceasing) its QE.86 But

80. Allan Sproul, The “Accord”—A Landmark in the First Fifty Years of the Federal Reserve
System, 58 ECON. POL’Y REV. 227, 277 (1964).
81. MELTZER, supra note 79, at 102. As Clay J. Anderson notes,
The Chairman of the Board of Governors stated [that] . . . “Everything else was thrown
into the background. The Board necessarily was obliged to follow the policies of the
Treasury Department and the Government.” . . . The preferential rates were kept in
line with the coupon rates on Treasury obligations, usually below the coupon rate on
current issues.
CLAY J. ANDERSON, A HALF-CENTURY OF FEDERAL RESERVE POLICYMAKING, 1914–1964, at
11 (1965), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/meltzer/andhal65.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5FJXJAV].
82. MELTZER, supra note 79, at 102.
83. Memorandum from Radha Chaurushiya & Ken Kuttner to Messrs. Kos & Reinhart on
Targeting the Yield Curve: The Experience of the Federal Reserve, 1942–51 (June 18, 2003)
[hereinafter Targeting the Yield Curve], https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
files/FOMC20030618memo01.pdf [https://perma.cc/D97E-BBSW].
84. Id. at 11.
85. It is not clear that the first three rounds of QE post-2008 were ever intended to be
monetary finance; indeed, the Fed committed to balance sheet normalization and took significant
steps to do this in 2017. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., FOMC Issues
Addendum to the Policy Normalization Principles and Plans (June 14, 2017), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20170614c.htm [https://perma.cc/
LA3M-EQE4].
86. See Jerome H. Powell, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Monetary Policy
in the Time of COVID, Address at the Macroeconomic Policy in an Uneven Economy Economic
Policy
Symposium
(Aug.
27,
2021),
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so long as popular appetite for monetary finance exists, the Fed
remains vulnerable to pressure to restart that long-ago discarded
practice.87 Indeed, such pressure can mount from different quarters:
from those who favor Modern Monetary Theory or from markets that
become dependent on asset-related interventions.88
Asset purchase programs could also, one day, evolve into more
activist versions if designed to allocate credit to certain groups (and not
others).89 Credit allocation is generally considered a fiscal, not a
monetary, function.
In crafting the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, Congress plainly
intended the Treasury to predominate where fiscal or credit matters
were concerned. Indeed, out of explicit concern that a newly created
Fed would take too much fiscal-type power, the Congress of 1913
added section 10(6) to that Federal Reserve Act. It provides:
Nothing in this Act contained shall be construed as taking away any
powers heretofore vested by law in the Secretary of the Treasury
which relate to the supervision, management, and control of the
Treasury Department and bureaus under such department, and
wherever any power vested by this Act in the Federal Reserve Board
or the Federal reserve agent appears to conflict with the powers of the

https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20210827a.htm [https://perma.cc/
9LXC-7QWA]; cf. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Issues
FOMC Statement (Jul. 28, 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/
monetary20210728a.htm [https://perma.cc/ H28G-GA5S] (implying that tapering will come in due
course).
87. As one observer remarked in May 2020, “the Federal Reserve is buying Treasury debt
on a scale that dwarfs 2008 and recalls the monetary-financing arrangements during World War
II.” Holland, supra note 75; see Daniel L. Thornton, Monetizing the Debt, FED. RSRV. BANK OF
ST. LOUIS, at 30, 40–41 (Dec. 1994). Those who espouse Modern Monetary Theory would, for
example, favor Fed financing of the deficit. See Dylan Matthews, Modern Monetary Theory,
Explained, VOX (Apr. 16, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/4/16/
18251646/modern-monetary-theory-new-moment-explained [https://perma.cc/QCY8-LDCU].
88. See Marvin Goodfriend & Jeffrey M. Lacker, Limited Commitment and Central Bank
Lending, FED. RSRV. BANK RICHMOND ECON. Q., Fall 1999, at 1, 1–2; see also ECON. AFFS.
COMM, supra note 76, at 23, 47–52 (making this point in regard to QE).
89. As one member of the FOMC remarked in 2008 in regard to QE, “I continue to believe
that the FOMC is the appropriate body for making monetary policy decisions and that replacing
monetary policy with credit policies that are unconstrained by this Committee is to violate both
good governance and the spirit of the operating understanding of the FOMC.” DECEMBER 15–
16, 2008, FOMC MEETING, supra note 63, at 192.
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Secretary of the Treasury, such powers shall be exercised subject to
the supervision and control of the Secretary.90

Here, Congress created a statutory bulwark against Fed incursion
into fiscal powers. Fast-forwarding to modern day, Congress also
expressed a wish to have the Fed remain out of credit policy when it
amended the language of section 13(3) to limit how the Fed could go
about “providing liquidity to the financial system.”91 By requiring that
all 13(3) assistance have “broad-based eligibility,”92 Congress explicitly
denied the Fed’s ability to conduct credit policy using its section 13(3)
authority.93
In addition to what Congress has said and done, the Fed itself has
established informal norms against a credit role. One of the most
recent statements to this effect is a 2009 joint press release by the Fed
and Treasury titled “The Role of the Federal Reserve in Preserving
Financial and Monetary Stability,” which included a passage
specifically directing the Fed “to avoid credit risk and credit
allocation”94:
The Federal Reserve’s lender-of-last-resort responsibilities
involve lending against collateral, secured to the satisfaction of the
responsible Federal Reserve Bank. Actions taken by the Federal
Reserve should also aim to improve financial or credit conditions
broadly, not to allocate credit to narrowly-defined sectors or classes
of borrowers. Government decisions to influence the allocation of
credit are the province of the fiscal authorities.95

90. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 10, 38 Stat. 251, 261 (1913) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 246) (emphasis added).
91. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
1101, 124 Stat. 1376, 2113 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343).
92. Id.
93. See Menand, supra note 58, at 300, 326–27. Today, Bagehot’s dictum is touted as a rule
that differentiates liquidity policy from credit policy—with good security, the Fed will not be
exposed to credit risk, and thus cannot be said to be engaging in any kind of credit policy.
Admittedly, however, Congress itself muddied these waters by blessing the Fed-Treasury joint
ventures in the 2020 liquidity facilities in the CARES Act. I will return to this below. See infra
notes 138–43 and accompanying text.
94. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. & Dep’t of the Treasury, The
Role of the Federal Reserve in Preserving Financial and Monetary Stability (Mar. 23, 2009)
(emphasis omitted), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary
20090323b.htm [https://perma.cc/GRU8-CSWN].
95. Id.
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This statement is consistent with the Fed’s postwar view that
engaging in credit policy would directly conflict with its core mandate.
As will be discussed in further depth below, in connection with the
Fed’s Main Street Lending Facilities, the Fed Board has recognized
that financing industry is (or should be seen) to be outside the Fed’s
core mandate since at least the 1950s.96 The dispositive question where
activism is concerned is thus whether allocation is an “incidental”
feature of a Fed program (as appeared to be the case in 2020) or a
program’s primary aim.97 Credit allocation, via asset purchases,
appears unsupported by the text or purpose of the Federal Reserve Act
and likely to skew the ordinary balance of power between the Treasury
and the Fed.98
Accordingly, while the 2020 asset purchases qua liquidity facilities
may have flirted with activism, they did not engage in it overtly.
Nevertheless, this expansion may have created precedent for
increasingly creative (or political) uses of the Fed’s balance sheet that
more boldly approach the line between the monetary and fiscal
96. See infra notes 134–36 and accompanying text.
97. As economist George Selgin explains, “Although every sort of central bank monetary
undertaking has fiscal consequences of some kind, economists typically distinguish between those
that have only incidental fiscal consequences and those specifically aimed at supporting particular
enterprises, markets, and investments. Only the last undertakings are generally understood to
encroach upon ‘fiscal’ policy.” SELGIN, supra note 75, at 7. For a thorough treatment of the
distinction between credit policy and monetary policy, see generally FED. RSRV. BANK OF BOS.,
CREDIT ALLOCATION TECHNIQUES AND MONETARY POLICY (1973). In addition, a point of
nuance here is required. The above text means to urge that credit policy, driven by the Fed, is
inconsistent with the purpose of the Federal Reserve Act—particularly when read against
contemporary notions of central bank independence. Section 13(2), and the Reserve Banks’
ability to fashion discount window policy, does, strictly speaking, afford those banks some legal
room to maneuver credit policy. For a seminal work arguing for a clear distinction between
monetary policy and credit policy, see generally Marvin Goodfriend & Robert G. King, Financial
Deregulation, Monetary Policy, and Central Banking, FED. RSRV. BANK RICHMOND ECON. REV.,
May/June 1998, at 3.
98. Charles I. Plosser, Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy: Restoring the Boundaries, Speech
at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum 6 (Feb. 24, 2012) (transcript available at
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/statements-speeches-charles-i-plosser-6101/fiscal-policy-monetarypolicy-restoring-boundaries-us-monetary-policy-forum-initiative-global-markets-university-chicagobooth-school-business-new-york-586709 [https://perma.cc/WN55-QQ86]) (noting that “[w]hen the
Fed engages in targeted credit programs that seek to alter the allocation of credit across
markets . . . it is engaging in fiscal policy and has breached the traditional boundaries established
between the fiscal authorities and the central bank”). That being said, these 2020 facilities were
done in partnership with Treasury, where Treasury provided a sizable amount of equity and took
a first loss position in each of these facilities. Menand, supra note 58, at 300, 330–32. This point
will be returned to in Part III, where this Article offers some normative views on when, if ever,
activism is acceptable.
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domains.99 Examples of what crossing over the line might look like,
with the Fed’s balance sheet and beyond, are considered in Part I.B
and I.C. in regard to climate change and inequality.
2. Foreign Exchange Swaps. The Fed has some authority in the
Federal Reserve Act to lend dollars abroad. Section 14 of the Federal
Reserve Act authorizes “cable transfers”—which encompass
transactions in foreign exchange100—which the Fed has used to justify

99. It bears noting that in 2020 and 2021, two other leading central banks came under
scrutiny as activist for their role in regard to asset purchases and quantitative easing. In Europe,
that program is known as the Public Sector Purchase Program (“PSPP”). In May 2020, a German
Constitutional Court ruled that the ECB exceeded its monetary policy authority and entered into
the arena of economic policy, which the EU treaties reserve for national governments. See Adam
Tooze, The Death of the Central Bank Myth, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 13, 2020, 2:57 PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/european-central-bank-myth-monetary-policy-germancourt-ruling [https://perma.cc/UPA6-8KWU]. The opinion, in German, can be found here,
BVerfG, 2 BvR 859/15, May 5, 2020, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/
Downloads/DE/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4 [https://
perma.cc/LPN2-G9QT]. In addition, the Royal Bank of New Zealand (“RBNZ”) was also heavily
criticized for engaging in QE on the ground that it “herald[ed] a shift into activism, where the
institutional distinction between monetary and fiscal policy is degraded.” Grant Wilson, Opinion,
RBNZ Puts Its Credibility on the Line, FIN. REV. (May 31, 2020, 6:26 PM),
https://www.afr.com/markets/currencies/rbnz-puts-its-credibility-on-the-line-20200531-p54y3a
[https://perma.cc/EH72-2X9E]; see also Wilson, supra note 26 (describing the negative effect of
QE on central banks’ credibility).
100. DAVID H. SMALL & JAMES A. CLOUSE, THE SCOPE OF MONETARY POLICY ACTIONS
AUTHORIZED UNDER THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 26 & n. 55 (2004), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2004/200440/200440pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TV4-VX4M] (“At
the time the Federal Reserve Act was passed in 1913, cable transfers were the method by which
foreign exchange could be purchased or sold: The purchase of foreign exchange was referred to
as the purchase of a cable transfer.”); Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet:
Central Bank Liquidity Swaps, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_liquidityswaps.htm [https://perma.cc/6SF43K2V]. As Edwin M. Truman explained:
Federal Reserve power to engage in “cable transfers” was the legal basis in the Federal
Reserve Act under which the Federal Reserve had operated in the foreign exchange
market in the past. There was a big examination of all this history in the early 1960s
with memos and opinions by the Attorney General. In the end, it was concluded that
the Federal Reserve did indeed have this authority, which it began to use again to a
limited degree in the early 1960s.
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD ORAL HISTORY PROJECT: INTERVIEW WITH EDWIN M. TRUMAN
106 (2009) [hereinafter INTERVIEW WITH EDWIN M. TRUMAN], https://www.federalreserve.gov/
aboutthefed/files/edwin-m-truman-interview-20091130.pdf [https://perma.cc/PR6F-HEDS].
The other possible source of authority is 14(e). See Alexander R. Perry, Note, The Federal
Reserve’s Questionable Legal Basis for Foreign Central Bank Liquidity Swaps, 120 COLUM. L.
REV. 729, 751–53 (2020).
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so-called “swap lines” with foreign countries.101 Swap lines work by
“swapping” dollars for the foreign currency—informally, the dollars
are a loan on an article of faith, not meaningfully secured.102 Swaps are
justified as support for the dollar market in a foreign country and
thereby protective of the global U.S. dollar markets and, in turn, U.S.
consumers and businesses.103 In particular, the Fed has explained the
swaps lines as designed to “help improve liquidity conditions in U.S.
dollar funding markets and to prevent the spread of strains to other
markets and financial centers.”104 But they sometimes also serve as
lifelines to foreign allies.105 As such, though couched under section 14,
these interventions can have a distinctively global LOLR flavor.
Again, some history of the origin of swaps lines provides
instructive context for their recent evolution. The Fed’s “network of
swap lines” with central banks around the world has roots in the
Bretton Woods era, when the Fed, at the direction of the Treasury,
offered swaps to its foreign counterparts as an alternative to redeeming
their excess cash for dwindling U.S. gold stock.106 Following the
101. See Peter Conti-Brown & David Zaring, The Foreign Affairs of the Federal Reserve, 44
J. CORP. L. 665, 692 (2018).
102. See Baker, supra note 55, at 1389–90. Technically, however, they are not loans, they are
foreign exchange swaps or foreign exchange purchases and sales. The Fed’s transfer of USD to
its foreign central bank counterparty is fully secured by taking possession of an equal amount of
the counterparty’s home currency. Id.
103. As the Fed describes them, they “are designed to improve liquidity conditions in dollar
funding markets in the United States and abroad by providing foreign central banks with the
capacity to deliver U.S. dollar funding to institutions in their jurisdictions during times of market
stress.” Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet: Frequently Asked Questions: U.S.
Dollar and Foreign Currency Liquidity Swaps, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.
[hereinafter Credit and Liquidity Programs: FAQs], https://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/bst_swapfaqs.htm [https://perma.cc/ES7P-J3QP].
104. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., FOMC Statement: Federal
Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of Canada, Bank of England, and Swiss National Bank
Announce Reestablishment of Temporary U.S. Dollar Liquidity Swap Facilities (May 9, 2010),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20100509a.htm [https://
perma.cc/9AK6-P8DF].
105. See David Zaring, The Government’s Economic Response to the COVID Crisis 39 (July
28, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3662049 [https://perma.cc/5NKT-KSTP]; see also Perry, supra note 100, at 746 (describing the
selective nature of central bank swap lines).
106. Michael D. Bordo, Owen F. Humpage & Anna J. Schwartz, The Evolution of the
Federal Reserve Swap Lines Since 1962, at 3–5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
20755, 2014). As Michael Bordo explains,
The [Bretton Woods] system was a compromise between the fixed exchange rates of
the gold standard, seen as conducive to rebuilding the network of global trade and
finance, and the greater flexibility to which countries had resorted in the 1930s to
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collapse of the Bretton Woods system, however, the Fed began using
swap lines on a more ad hoc basis, whenever it was necessary to counter
“disorderly market conditions.”107 Notable examples include the U.K.
sterling crisis of 1964–67108 and the Mexican peso crisis of 1994–95.109
Historically, the Fed opened swap lines on an emergency-type
basis—only when necessary to counter “disorderly market
conditions.”110 But in 2007, the Fed began to ramp up its foreign
exchange affairs. That year, after the mounting financial crisis put
pressures on dollar funding markets around the world, the Fed created
two swap lines, with the ECB and the Swiss National Bank..111 Twelve
more—with Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Sweden,
Norway, Denmark, New Zealand, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and
Singapore—followed in late 2008, for a total of fourteen swap lines,
with their aggregate value peaking at $583 billion in December of that
year.112
restore and maintain domestic economic and financial stability . . . . The compromise
created an adjustable peg system based on the US dollar convertible into gold at $35
per ounce along with capital controls.
Michael Bordo, The Operation and Demise of the Bretton Woods System: 1958 to 1971, VoxEU
(Apr. 23, 2017), https://voxeu.org/article/operation-and-demise-bretton-woods-system [https://
perma.cc/WG3A-A8R2].
107. Foreign Exchange Operations, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/
markets/international-market-operations/foreign-exchange-operations [https://perma.cc/29JMTSNV]; Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange
Operations, 52 FED. RSRV. BULL. 316–18 (1966) [hereinafter Foreign Exchange Operations].
108. Michael D. Bordo, Ronald MacDonald & Michael J. Oliver, Sterling in Crisis, 1964–
1967, 13 EUR. REV. ECON. HIST. 437, 440−44 (2009).
109. Edwin M. Truman, The Federal Reserve Engages the World (1970–2000): An Insider’s
Narrative of the Transition to Managed Floating and Financial Turbulence 32 (Peterson Inst. for
Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. WP-14-5, 2014).
110. Foreign Exchange Operations, supra note 107. However, as Broaddus and Goodfriend
point out, that term has never been defined operationally. J. Alfred Broaddus, Jr. & Marvin
Goodfriend, Foreign Exchange Operations and the Federal Reserve, FED. RSRV. BANK
RICHMOND ECON. Q., Winter 1996, at 1, 9. See generally INTERVIEW WITH EDWIN M. TRUMAN,
supra note 100, at 106, 139, 313 (describing the Fed’s limited early use of foreign exchange
interventions).
111. Credit and Liquidity Programs: FAQs, supra note 103; U.S. Dollar Liquidity Swaps,
Supplementary FAQs, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS. (Dec. 21, 2010),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/monetary20100510.pdf [https://
perma.cc/46YP-WFAU]; Michael J. Fleming & Nicholas J. Klagge, The Federal Reserve’s Foreign
Exchange Swap Lines, FED. RSRV. BANK N.Y. CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN., Apr. 2010, at 1,
3–4.
112. Id. at 3–5; Alister Bull, Top Central Banks Renew Currency Swaps as Precaution,
REUTERS (Dec. 13, 2012, 8:56 AM), http://reut.rs/XgCJFV [https://perma.cc/X49Q-SWCH];
Iñaki Aldasoro, Torsten Ehlers, Patrick McGuire & Goetz von Peter, Global Banks’ Dollar

SKINNER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

276

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/22/2021 9:59 AM

[Vol. 71:247

Fourteen of the swap lines created during the 2008 financial crisis
were retired by early 2010; but five of them—with the Bank of Canada,
Bank of England, Bank of Japan, ECB, and Swiss National Bank—
were resurrected later that spring, once the Eurozone Crisis created
new pressures in dollar funding markets abroad.113 And after several
renewals, the Fed announced in 2013 that these swap lines would be
made into a permanent and standing arrangement, billing them as a
“prudent liquidity backstop” to “ease strains in financial markets and
mitigate their effects on economic conditions.”114
In 2020, amidst the market fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, the
Fed reopened swap lines with nine of its central bank counterparties
from the financial crisis, effectively cementing its global LOLR role.115
It made $60 billion available to each of the central banks in Australia,
Brazil, Korea, Mexico, Singapore, and Sweden; $30 billion was
available to Denmark, Norway, and New Zealand.116 The Fed thus
embraced a relatively larger LOLR role during the 2008 global
financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic than it had practiced
before.117 The expanse of this contemporary support for foreign dollar
markets prompted one Fed watcher to prickle: “Why is the Fed sending
billions of dollars all over the world?”118
Whether swaps are activist central banking policy again depends
on the purpose for which they are used. Operations aimed to support
the dollar markets are distinct from foreign aid. There is tremendous
U.S. interest in the sturdiness of the dollar as the reserve currency of
the world. On the other hand, a global LOLR role is not consistent with
the text and purpose of section 13(3), which contemplates assistance to
Funding Needs and Central Bank Swap Lines, BIS BULL. (BIS, Basel, Switzerland), July 16, 2020,
at 1, 6.
113. Id.
114. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve and Other
Central Banks Convert Temporary Bilateral Liquidity Swap Arrangements to Standing
Arrangements (Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/
monetary20131031a.htm [https://perma.cc/49CQ-NDY3].
115. Central Bank Swap Arrangements, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., https://
www.newyorkfed.org/markets/international-market-operations/central-bank-swaparrangements [https://perma.cc/4XL9-3AKD].
116. Id.
117. See Conti-Brown & Zaring, supra note 101, at 691–92; Zaring, supra note 105.
118. Greg Rosalsky, Why Is the Fed Sending Billions of Dollars All Over the World, NPR:
PLANET MONEY (Apr. 21, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2020/04/21/
839374663/why-is-the-fed-sending-billions-of-dollars-all-over-the-world [https://perma.cc/5SXTYCZ6].
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domestic institutions, not a foreign economy.119 Swaps used as foreign
aid raise structural concerns by inserting the Fed into foreign affairs—
a domain reserved for Congress and the president.120 As Professor
David Zaring notes, adopting a global LOLR role “places the Fed in
the position of making foreign policy determinations about which
foreign central banks to favor and which to disfavor.”121 Those kinds of
value and political judgments are more properly for the legislature (or
the president).
Optics also matter. The perception that the Fed uses swaps to
dispense foreign aid could invite pressure on the Fed to go further. If
the Fed appears, at least to some, to select dollar winners and losers
around the world, that activity will raise questions in the minds of those
concerned about the disparate impact of globalization and the duties
attendant to world economic power. Some already suggest that the Fed
should be lending more generously to developing market economies,
presumably as a means of promoting redistribution from wealthy to
poorer nations.122 Today, the Fed can defend its decisions regarding
which central banks to lend to based on the creditworthiness of the
borrowing nation and ensuing implications for the U.S. public fisc. But
such explanations may carry less weight if and as the Fed lends dollars
abroad much more widely, inviting calls upon the Fed to start acting
more like a backup IMF.123 For those that would favor activism, the
Fed might seem to assume responsibility for providing all of the dollars
that the global economy needs when it needs them.124
3. Small Businesses. The final example of LOLR expansion
involves Congress’s decision to involve the Fed in small business
(“Main Street”) lending in 2020. The economic impact of the COVID19 pandemic strained not only financial institutions but also businesses
and households. But, on their face, the Fed’s liquidity assistance tools

119. See 12 U.S.C. § 343.
120. See Conti-Brown & Zaring, supra note 101, at 666.
121. Zaring, supra note 105, at 38.
122. See, e.g., Daniel Bradlow & Stephen Park, A Global Leviathan Emerges: The Federal
Reserve, Covid-19, and International Law, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 657, 662–65 (2020).
123. Id.
124. See Barry Eichengreen, George C. Pardee & Helen N. Pardee Professor of Econ. & Pol.
Sci. at the Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Butlin Lecture: It May Be Our Currency, but It’s Your Problem
1–2 (Feb. 18, 2011) (transcript available at https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/
papers/BWpaper_EICHENGREEN_040811.pdf [https://perma.cc/444J-AM2P]).
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did not stretch that far—again, 10B is limited to banks125 and 13(3) to
the provision of liquidity to the “financial system” only.126 Small and
medium-sized businesses are not financial firms. To get around these
obvious limitations in the Fed’s LOLR powers, Congress authorized
the Fed in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(“CARES”) Act to offer assistance to small and medium sized
businesses through a (one-time-only?) expanded reading of 13(3).127
Accordingly, and under 13(3), the Fed created its Main Street Lending
Program, which operated through five separate lending facilities.128
Perhaps not surprisingly, these facilities exposed the Fed to political
pressure to assist one sector of the real economy or another.129
There is certainly some historical dissonance in the Main Street
Lending Program. The Fed, for a time, did have the power to lend to
industry under section 13(b) of the Federal Reserve Act.130 But most
historical accounts of 13(b) recognize it as a mistaken attempt to
position the Reserve Banks as pseudocommercial lenders during a
decades-long confusion about their role within the Federal Reserve
System.131 As David Fettig of the St. Louis Fed explains, this confusion
was mostly resolved by 1957.132 At that point, the then-Fed chair
William McChesney Martin had “exorcised most of the demons of
Section 13(b)” by informing the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee that the Board has eschewed “small business financing” out
of

125. 12 U.S.C. § 347b(a).
126. Id. § 343.
127. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 4003(c)(3)(D)(ii), 134 Stat. 470, 474 (2020)
(authorizing the Fed to use section 13(3) to establish a “Main Street Lending Program”).
128. Main Street Lending Program, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mainstreetlending.htm [https://perma.cc/5G7FNB6L].
129
See e.g., Rachel Siegel, Congress Needs To Weigh in on Expanding Main Street Loan Program
to More Businesses, Boston Fed Chief Says, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/09/08/main-street-fed-loans [https://perma.cc/AKN3PBFD]; Jeanna Smialek, Oversight Member Blasts the Fed’s Efforts To Rescue Main Street, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/07/business/economy/federal-reserve-mainstreet-lending.html [https://perma.cc/U4GJ-RKD6].
130. See HACKLEY, supra note 40, at 133.
131. See, e.g., David Fettig, Lender of More than Last Resort, FED. RSRV. BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS, (Dec. 1, 2002), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2002/lender-of-more-thanlast-resort [https://perma.cc/4BR5-CA8C] (describing Section 13(b) as a “discomfiting” chapter
in the history of Federal Reserve policy).
132. Id.
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concern . . . from the belief that it is good government as well as good
central banking for the Federal Reserve to devote itself primarily to
objectives set for it by the Congress, namely, guiding monetary policy
and credit policy so as to exert its influence toward maintaining the
value of the dollar and fostering orderly economic growth.133

Congress removed 13(b) from the Federal Reserve Act the following
year.134 In the pointed words of the late economist Anna J. Schwartz,
13(b) has gone down in history as “a sorry reflection on both
Congress’s and the Fed’s understanding of the System’s essential
monetary control function.”135
It seemed unthinkable that industrial lending would come back
onto the Fed’s lending menu. Indeed, on March 15, 2020, Fed Chair
Jerome Powell disavowed a modern role for the Fed in supporting the
businesses of the real economy. In a press conference, Powell
remarked,
[W]e don’t have the tools to reach individuals and particularly small
businesses and other businesses and people who may be out of work
. . . . We don’t have those tools. . . . [T]his is a multifaceted problem,
and it requires answers from different parts of the government and
society. . . . I think fiscal policy is a way to direct relief, really, to
particular populations and groups. . . . We do think fiscal response[s]
[are] critical.136

Either oblivious or unconcerned with the history of 13(b), a few days
later, Congress put the Fed back into this quasi-fiscal role of allocating
credit to non-financial small businesses.137
While the congressional authorization in CARES mutes activism
concerns, it does not obviate them—it simply demonstrates that
legislatures can themselves create the conditions for the Fed to engage

133. Id.
134. Id.; see also HACKLEY, supra note 40, at 144–45 (describing how business interest in
13(b) loans “tapered off” as early as 1936, just two years after the authority was created, and did
not recover until 13(b) was repealed in 1958). In any case, by that point, the program had become
moribund. To browse the archive of William McChesney Martin, see William McChesney Martin,
Jr., Papers, FRASER, https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/archival-collection/william-mcchesney-martinjr-papers-1341 [https://perma.cc/VHT6-6HFD].
135. Anna J. Schwartz, Senior Rerseach Fellow, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., The Misuse of
the Fed’s Discount Window, Address at St. Louis University (Apr. 9, 1992), in 74 FED. RSRV.
BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 58, 61 (1992).
136. Powell, supra note 68.
137. See CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 4003(c)(3)(D)(ii), 134 Stat. 470, 474 (2020).
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in activism.138 Congress did not, after all, make it clear—even with the
CARES Act—that small business lending was an appropriate task for
the Fed to do.139 For one, Congress did not resolve the “unusual and
exigent” proviso in section 13(3).140 So questions of interpretation
remain. For instance, does “unusual and exigent” circumstances equal
recession-like conditions?141 Furthermore, section 13(3) requires, in its
text, that a borrower demonstrate it cannot obtain adequate financing
elsewhere.142 But the Main Street lending facilities (as revised)
appeared to allow a lower standard.143 Did Congress bless this sub
silentio?
Outside of the Main Street facilities, the Fed also supported the
real economy indirectly by lending to banks that would provide small
business loans—the Fed incentivized the banks to make those loans by
agreeing to take the small business loans (which were government-

138. See Menand, supra note 58, at 351–52 (noting that in sub silentio overriding the Federal
Reserve Act, Congress leaves many questions unanswered).
139. The main concerns the Board of Governors harbored about 13(b) throughout the 1950s
were that: (1) lending directly to small businesses forced the Fed to work with long-term interest
rates and equity-like assets, both of which were far removed from the short-term rates and
Treasury bills the Fed has expertise in working with, see Credit Needs of Small Business: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Small Bus. of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong. 512
(1957) (statement of William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System), and (2) lending extensively to the real economy could undermine
monetary discipline, creating inflationary pressures, see Fettig, supra note 131. Congress appeared
to concur with these concerns when it repealed 13(b) in 1958 —but when it retasked the Fed with
lending to the real economy through the CARES Act, it made no effort to explain why these
“demons of 13(b)” were no longer of concern. Id. In fact, there was no acknowledgment of this
legislative history at all.
140. 12 U.S.C. § 343.
141. See Thomas L. Hogan, Small Business Lending Is Not the Fed’s Job, AM. INST. FOR
ECON. RSCH. (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.aier.org/article/small-business-lending-is-not-the-fedsjob [https://perma.cc/Q6T6-83F2] (arguing that construing “unusual and exigent” to mean
recession-like conditions would be too broad).
142. 12 U.S.C. § 343.
143. For eligibility requirements, see 13 C.F.R. § 120.111 (2021). The original term sheets for
the Main Street Lending Program required eligible borrowers to attest that they “require[d]
financing” due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but that requirement was dispensed with in
subsequent term sheets. Compare Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Term
Sheet: Main Street New Loan Facility (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/pressreleases/files/monetary20200409a7.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UVA-9QA7]
(containing a requirement that applicants attest they need financing due to the COVID-19
pandemic), with Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Term Sheet: Main Street
New
Loan
Facility (Apr.
30,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
pressreleases/files/monetary20200430a1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H87F-36RT] (containing no such
requirement).

SKINNER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

CENTRAL BANK ACTIVISM

10/22/2021 9:59 AM

281

guaranteed) as collateral.144 Though collateral requirements are a
grayer area, some may wonder whether stretching collateral eligibility
requirements in this way—that is, accepting good collateral but with a
clear fiscal policy purpose in view—could be considered activist as
well.145
On the whole, Congress may have prodded the Fed into activism
by vaguely asking the central bank to develop and administer the Main
Street Lending Program. Congress instructed the Fed to act beyond its
mandate but did not in fact amend or suspend the law in the Federal
Reserve Act.146 As a result, Congress muddied the LOLR waters,
thereby setting the stage for future bouts of activism.
B. Inequality
In 1977, Congress added section 2A to the Federal Reserve Act,
which confers a so-called dual mandate on the Fed.147 In particular, 2A
requires the Fed to fashion monetary policies that pursue price stability
(i.e., guard against inflation148) and maximum employment.149 Starting

144. Haoyang Liu & Desi Volker, The Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility
(PPPLF), LIBERTY ST. ECON. (May 20, 2020), https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/
2020/05/the-paycheck-protection-program-liquidity-facility-ppplf.html [https://perma.cc/5T9HEB74]. The Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility (“PPPLF”) was viewed as an
important step in supporting the Paycheck Protection Program, administered by the Small
Business Administration, given that smaller banks were more likely to reach a broader swath of
underserved communities. Id. PPPLF involves ensuring that smaller originators can get funding
on attractive terms and that there will be a favorable regulatory treatment for the PPP loans. Id.
It works by allowing financial institutions to borrow money while pledging PPP loans as collateral
and giving zero risk weight to any PPP loans pledged to the PPLF. Id.
145. See infra Part II.B (discussing collateral policy in the 1920s). The Reserve banks have
considerable discretion here. Infra Part II.B.
146. Menand, supra note 58, at 351–53 (arguing that CARES sub silentio overruled section
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, but it remains unclear to what permanent effect).
147. 12 U.S.C. § 225a.
148. “Inflation is a general, sustained upward movement of prices for goods and services in
an economy. (Think overall prices–not the price of a single good.).” Kristie Engemann, The Fed’s
Inflation Target: Why 2 Percent?, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2019/january/fed-inflation-target-2-percent [https://
perma.cc/J8HJ-JPU6].
149. 12 U.S.C. § 225a. The Fed is notably distinct among other of the world’s leading central
banks, most of which have a price stability mandate but not one that regards employment. Simon
Dikau & Ulrich Volz, Central Bank Mandates, Sustainability Objectives and the Promotion of
Green Finance, 184 ECOLOGICAL ECON., Apr. 2021, at 1, 10–14 (reviewing the “mandated
objectives” of various central banks). Note that “price stability” or “inflation targeting” is most
common, with only a handful of banks also being required to support the economic policy of the
government and/or focus on growth or employment. See id.
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in the mid-1990s, the Fed unofficially pursued a target of 2 percent
inflation per year;150 and that 2 percent target was formalized in 2012.151
Since the 1990s, the world’s leading central banks have built consensus
around that 2 percent inflation target.152
In 2020, however, the Fed overhauled its monetary policy
framework for the first time in more than a decade. In an August 2020
press announcement, Chair Powell announced that the FOMC would
no longer target a 2 percent inflation rate, but rather, an average
inflation rate of 2 percent.153 The difference may seem subtle, but it is
tremendously substantive. It means that the Fed will no longer take
steps to cool down economic activity when inflation reaches 2 percent.
Instead, the Fed has committed to taking a wait-and-see approach—it
will only decide to “liftoff” when the FOMC has also satisfied its
employment goals.154 In essence, this policy of average inflation
targeting (“AIT”) commits the Fed to keeping “interest rates low for
as long as it takes to employ as many people as possible.”155
As explained by the Fed and on its face, this methodological shift
was in the first instance a reaction to real developments in the United

150. James Bullard, President, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, CFA Society Chicago –
Distinguished Speakers Series: What is the Best Strategy for Extending the U.S. Economy’s
Expansion (Sept. 12, 2018) (presentation slides available at https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/
media/Files/PDFs/Bullard/remarks/2018/Bullard_CFA_Chicago_12_Sept_2018.pdf?la=en
[https://perma.cc/U6P8-6QTP]).
151. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Issues FOMC
Statement of Longer-Run Goals and Policy Strategy (Jan. 25, 2012), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20120125c.htm [https://perma.cc/
ZJ9Q-L4B4] (“The Committee judges that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the
annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over
the longer run with the Federal Reserve’s statutory mandate.”).
152. See John Ammer & Richard Freeman, Inflation Targeting in the 1990s: The Experiences
of New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom, 47 J. ECON. & BUS. 165, 165–66 (1995).
153. Jerome H. Powell, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., New Economic
Challenges and the Fed’s Monetary Policy Review, Speech at Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City Economic Policy Symposium (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/powell20200827a.htm [https://perma.cc/5PY4-7MCH].
154. Id.; see also Richard H. Clarida, Vice Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
The Federal Reserve’s New Framework: Context and Consequences, Speech at the Brookings
Institution
(Nov.
16,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
clarida20201116a.htm [https://perma.cc/YZ6Y-Y9EU] (noting that “at the time of liftoff, in
addition to inflation reaching 2 percent (on an annual basis), labor market conditions must have
also reached levels consistent with the Committee’s assessments of maximum employment”).
155. Guida, supra note 3.
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States and global economies over the past few decades.156 In view of
these economic shifts, the adoption of AIT is best seen as an effort to
realign policy in light of these real-world developments. A secondary
benefit is that AIT also allows the Fed to avoid socially undesirable
distributional impacts associated with tightening prematurely, as it
might under a firm 2 percent regime.
However, as with other examples discussed above, this move has
left room for activism at points later down the road. AIT is sufficiently
open-ended to allow for an offensive targeting of inequality via greater
emphasis on the employment arm of the Fed’s dual mandate. But
Congress did not give the Fed a mandate to use monetary policy to
mitigate inequality in section 2A (or elsewhere).
The first time Congress contemplated a federal role in
employment was in the Employment Act of 1946.157 In that piece of
legislation, the government committed to the principles of Keynesian
economics, which was ascendent in the 1930s and 1940s.158 Accordingly,
in the context of the period, the Employment Act’s references to the
term “full employment” imported the Keynesian logic that the point of
frictional unemployment is also the point of optimal economic
growth.159
156. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO
CONGRESS 40 (2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/20210219_
mprfullreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4YG-K767]; Richard H. Clarida, Vice Chair, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., U.S. Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy, Speech at the
International Economics Council on Foreign Relations (Jan. 8, 2021), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/clarida20210108a.htm [https://perma.cc/S8D5D2FG]. The Fed extensively publishes internal documents and models that show optimal
monetary policy today—because of highly uncertain estimates of neutral interest rates and
sinking inflation expectations (relatively to pre-GFC levels)—is more accommodative than
rational agent models would imply. See, e.g., Andrea Ajello, Isabel Cairó, Vasco Cúrdia, Thomas
A. Lubik & Albert Queralto, Monetary Policy Tradeoffs and the Federal Reserve’s Dual Mandate
1–4 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv., Working Paper No. 2020-066, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2020066pap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L6LLNU2D]. This “make-up” strategy is deemed optimal without taking political considerations into
account. See id. at 6.
157. Employment Act of 1946, ch. 33, § 2, 60 Stat. 23, 23 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1021).
158. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, TACKLING UNEMPLOYMENT: THE LEGISLATIVE DYNAMICS
OF THE EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1946, at 1‒45 (2013).
159. See id.; see also PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED
BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT 52‒53 (2011) (discussing the Employment Act). See
generally J. Bradford De Long, Keynesianism, Pennsylvania Avenue Style: Some Economic
Consequences of the Employment Act of 1946, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 41 (1996) (discussing this period
generally).
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The term “maximum employment” thus considered full
employment and economic growth as two sides of the same coin.160
Eventually, the employment goals of the Employment Act found their
way into section 2A of the Federal Reserve Act (by way of the
Humphrey Hawkins Act).161 That employment was a proxy for growth
seemed a relatively well-accepted meaning—indeed, so much so that
“until recently the [FOMC] had been cautious not to state its policy
objectives in terms of either full employment or the unemployment
rate, preferring instead to state its dual mandate in terms of price
stability and economic growth.”162 It thus seems possible to conclude
that, since at least 1946, Congress has equated “employment” with
“economic growth”—not necessarily equality.163
But at least some of the current Fed Governors appear to favor
such interpretive slippage. As Fed Governor Lael Brainard explained
the 2020 revamp, “[t]he deep and disparate damage caused by the
pandemic, coming just over a decade after the financial crisis,
underscores the vital importance of full employment, particularly for
low- and moderate-income workers and those facing systemic
challenges in the labor market.”164 Fed Chair Powell has also made
some statements to similar effect:
With regard to the employment side of our mandate, our revised
statement emphasizes that maximum employment is a broad-based
and inclusive goal. This change reflects our appreciation for the

160. See § 2, 60 Stat. at 23.
161. See Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-523, 92 Stat. 1887
(1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3152).
162. Daniel L. Thornton, The Dual Mandate: Has the Fed Changed Its Objective, 94 FED.
RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 117, 117 (2012) [hereinafter Thornton, The Dual Mandate]; Daniel
L. Thornton, What Does the Change in the FOMC’s Statement of Objectives Mean?, ECON.
SYNOPSES (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, M.O.), Jan. 3, 2011, at 1, 2 (noting that between
1978 and 2010, there was virtually no mention of the Fed’s “employment” target in any FOMC
minutes).
163. See Aaron Steelman, The Federal Reserve’s “Dual Mandate”: The Evolution of an Idea,
ECON. BRIEF (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Richmond, Richmond, V.A.), Dec. 2011, at 1, 5 (discussing the
dual mandate and its origins).
164. Lael Brainard, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Inaugural Mike
McCracken Lecture on Full Employment: Full Employment in the New Monetary Policy
Framework
(Jan.
13,
2021),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
brainard20210113a.htm [https://perma.cc/LE45-S558].
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benefits of a strong labor market, particularly for many in low- and
moderate-income communities.165

Arguably, the Fed would require additional instruction from Congress
to equate its employment mandate with a mandate for equality in the
way that these remarks could be taken to suggest.
Short of equating employment with equality, the Fed could also
reshuffle its priorities, elevating the employment arm of the 2A
mandate over the price stability arm. While perhaps not legally
prohibited, policy that prioritizes employment over price stability
would seem contrary to the overarching purpose of section 2A. To see
why, consider the origins of the Fed’s price stability mandate in the
1970s and the intellectual paradigms of the day.166
During that decade, the theoretical connection between price
stability and the aggregate welfare was borne out empirically.167 The
U.S. economy suffered greatly from a period of “stagflation” at that
time—that is, years of intractable inflation and very high
unemployment.168 Until that point, economists and policymakers
believed that an economy could always dig its way out of an
unemployment rut by accepting more inflation. This Keynesian view
of the economy theorized that programs of government spending
would be likely to reduce the relative value of the dollar but, on the
plus side, such programs would also increase labor demand and thus
employment.169 But in practice, it did not work. Eventually, Paul
Volcker arrived as Chairman of the Fed in 1979 with a winning strategy
165. Powell, supra note 68. Politico reporter Victoria Guida has put it in less veiled terms:
“It’s an acknowledgment that rate hikes in previous business cycles, intended to head off inflation,
have caused some people to miss out on the benefits of economic growth. Disproportionately,
those people have been minorities.” Guida, supra note 3.
166. The Fed’s monetary policy authority hinges on an economic understanding that stable
prices maximize utility and in turn social welfare. Prices that vary in sporadic and unpredictable
ways would give rise to deadweight losses. Michael Woodford, Inflation Stabilization and Welfare
3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 8071, 2001). “A deadweight loss is a cost to
society as a whole that is generated by an economically inefficient allocation of resources within
the market. Deadweight loss can also be referred to as ‘excess burden.’” Prateek Agarwal,
Deadweight
Loss,
INTELLIGENT
ECONOMIST
(Mar.
18,
2020),
https://
www.intelligenteconomist.com/deadweight-loss [https://perma.cc/ZM5F-QKTC].
167. This Article returns to lessons from the 1970s infra Part II.C.
168. See BRIAN W. CASHELL & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34428,
UNDERSTANDING STAGFLATION AND THE RISK OF ITS RECURRENCE 1‒5 (2008).
169. For a short primer on Keynes, see Sarwat Jahan, Ahmed Saber Mahmud & Chris
Papageorgiou, What Is Keynesian Economics, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2014, at 53, 54, https://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2014/09/pdf/basics.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BGN-KF2C].
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for beating stagflation—getting inflation in check without worrying
about employment.170
The Volcker Fed adopted a price-stability-first policy.171 This was
not because unemployment was not concerning, but rather, as
economists had come to realize, employment could not be increased
without price stability. As Volcker explained before becoming Chair,
I don’t think that we have the choice in current circumstances—the
old tradeoff analysis—of buying full employment with a little more
inflation. We found out that doesn’t work, and we are in an economic
situation in which we can’t achieve either of those objectives
immediately. We have to work toward both of them; we have to deal
with inflation.172

In a similar vein, Volcker reported to Congress that:
I do not want to suggest or claim other factors are not relevant in the
inflationary process, but I do believe that moderation in monetary
growth is a necessary condition for the restoration of reasonable price
stability, and that progress in that direction, far from conflicting with
growth and employment goals, will over time prove a prerequisite to
continued and orderly growth. Put another way, I think the
experience of recent years strongly suggests that a resurgence of
inflationary pressures would be damaging to our employment goals
and to the purpose of sustaining the expansion.173

Ultimately, the Volcker Fed was correct on the merits. With
considerable tightening of interest rates, the “Great Inflation” of that
era eventually came under the Fed’s control.174 To avoid future
economic “disarray,” the Fed continued to be disciplined about
inflation targeting175 (until August 2020).

170. See Thornton, The Dual Mandate, supra note 162, at 128.
171. See id.
172. Steelman, supra note 163, at 3.
173. Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977: Hearing on H.R. 8094 Before the H. Comm. on
Banking, Fin. & Urban Affs., 95th Cong. 90 (1977) (statement of Paul Volcker, Chair, Federal
Reserve).
174. William Poole, President’s Message: Volcker’s Handling of the Great Inflation Taught Us
Much, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Jan. 1, 2005), https://www.stlouisfed.org/
publications/regional-economist/january-2005/volckers-handling-of-the-great-inflation-taughtus-much [https://perma.cc/QU38-T5YB].
175. See Marvin Goodfriend, How the World Achieved Consensus on Monetary Policy 24‒25
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 13580, 2007), https://www.nber.org/
system/files/working_papers/w13580/w13580.pdf [https://perma.cc/EUU8-S5S9]; Adam Shapiro
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Against this background and history, one can see why elevating
the employment side of the mandate—in this case, to strive for more
equality—would divorce the economic logic behind the Fed’s
monetary authority from the legal power in section 2A, with potentially
problematic macroeconomic effect.
Now, to be sure, the global economy has changed significantly
since the Volcker days. Among these changes, neutral interest rates
have declined and the Phillips curve—which assumes a tradeoff
between inflation and employment—seems flatter.176 But those
economic shifts do not necessarily mean monetary policy can or should
let the rope slip on inflation. An expansive monetary policy—driven
forward by efforts to reduce inequality by pressing too hard on
employment—could usher in a period of inflation reminiscent of the
1970s or the postwar periods. This prediction will become more likely
if and as the government’s budget deficit grows.177
As with other forms of activism, there would be larger structural
costs were the Fed to use its new framework to proactively pursue
equality. For one, by interpreting section 2A in this way, the Fed would
be making a value judgment—society should accept higher inflation
(less stable prices) in favor of more employment.178 But, as will be
& Daniel J. Wilson, The Evolution of the FOMC’s Explicit Inflation Target, FRBSF ECON.
LETTER (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of S.F., San Francisco, C.A.), Apr. 15, 2019, at 1, 1–3, https://
www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/el2019-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/YS53-EE4U].
176. See Kristie Engemann, What Is the Phillips Curve (and Why Has It Flattened)?, OPEN
VAULT BLOG (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2020/january/what-isphillips-curve-why-flattened [https://perma.cc/R5X6-MX9G].
177. See Kate Davidson, U.S. Ran Record $1.9 Trillion Budget Deficit in First Seven Months
of Fiscal Year, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2021, 2:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-ran-record1-9-trillion-budget-deficit-in-first-seven-months-of-fiscal-year-11620842400 [https://perma.cc/
47PC-BK5W]; Anita Kumar, Biden Begins Selling His $4T Spending Plans, POLITICO (Apr. 29,
2021, 7:34 PM), https://politi.co/2SgguZN [https://perma.cc/9G84-CY5V]; CONG. BUDGET OFF.,
THE 2021 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 5 (2021) (estimating that at this rate, debt-to-GDP
ratio will exceed 200 percent by 2051). Modern monetary theorists (“MMT”) essentially believe
that government spending is benign and should be used toward progressive ends. See Alex J.
Pollock, Inflation Comes for the Profligate, LAW & LIBERTY (Mar. 2, 2021),
https://lawliberty.org/inflation-comes-for-the-profligate [https://perma.cc/3KC4-DZYR]. As one
writer noted, “[s]ounding the alarm about inflation is out of vogue.” Michael D. Bordo & Mickey
D. Levy, The Short March Back to Inflation, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2021, 2:17 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-short-march-back-to-inflation-11612378471 [https://perma.cc/
NM6U-VBWR].
178. This statement is premised on a non-vertical long-run Phillips curve. It remains to be
seen whether the Phillips curve is permanently or temporarily flattened. See Olivier Blanchard,
Should We Reject the Natural Rate Hypothesis? 2, 15 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working
Paper No. 17-14, 2017), https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents/wp17-14.pdf
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discussed in full below, that should be Congress’s decision. Moreover,
to the extent the Fed were to shoehorn inequality into “employment,”
it may appear a reaction to political, popular, and international
pressure.
Yet when the Fed appears malleable to pressure, it opens the door
to future trade-offs for political gain. A Fed that is tied to a 2 percent
mast maintains a valuable political economy buffer—self-constrained
as such, the Fed had principled grounds for resisting presidential
pressure to, for example, run a ‘hot’ economy at the expense of price
stability.179 By unmooring itself from the 2 percent anchor, the Fed may
invite such pressure going forward and weaken its defenses against
politics.
C. Climate Change
The final case study of contemporary activism looks into 2021 and
beyond in regard to climate change.180 In recent years, central banks
worldwide have begun to consider how their array of monetary policy,
regulatory, and supervisory tools might be expanded to mitigate
climate change.
In broad strokes, the movement endorses a variety of policy
measures geared toward making the economy greener. In regard to
monetary policy, for example, some central banks now consider
whether a green version of quantitative easing could be adopted,
whereby central banks commit to buying “green bonds”—not for
purposes of mitigating economic crisis—but instead for the purpose of
facilitating more green business.181 Other policy suggestions involve

[https://perma.cc/5BTR-E25F] (explaining the natural rate hypothesis and suggesting that the
long-run Phillips curve could be sloped).
179. See Salib & Skinner, supra note 27, at 960‒68 (discussing those presidents that did
inappropriately lean on Fed Chairs to inflate the economy in order to gain political popularity
associated with a strong economy); see also Allan H. Meltzer, Origins of the Great Inflation, 87
FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 145, 145‒75 (“Politicians elected for four- or five-year terms
put much more weight on employment—jobs, jobs, jobs—than on a future inflation.”).
180. For a comprehensive account of the Fed’s legal power to address climate change, see
generally Skinner, supra note 5.
181. See, e.g., Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, BIS Launches Second Green Bond
Fund for Central Banks (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.bis.org/press/p210125.htm
[https://perma.cc/4F6S-VJFY]; Emanuele Campiglio, Yannis Dafermos, Pierre Monnin, Josh
Ryan-Collins, Guido Schotten & Misa Tanaka, Climate Change Challenges for Central Banks and
Financial Regulators, 8 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 462, 465 (2018); Benoît Cœuré, Member of
the Exec. Bd. of the Eur. Cent. Bank, The Role of Central Banks: Monetary Policy and Climate
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using regulation and supervision to deter banks from lending to
“brown” business while incentivizing them to lend to green ones.182
Prominent ideas for this kind of regulation include increasing riskbased capital requirements in regards to certain kinds of nongreen
loans, thereby disincentivizing their origination.183 Informally,
supervisory priorities and pronouncements could accomplish similar
effects.184
Numerous central banks are moving in such direction.185 For the
most part, central bankers have framed the climate conversation in
stark, but not necessarily legal, terms. As Jen Weidmann, Chair of the
Board of Directors for the Bank for International Settlements,
remarked in January 2021, “climate change presents a challenge for all
humanity. . . . Therefore, every institution is right to ask itself what
contribution it can make to mitigating climate change within the remit
Change, Speech at the Conference on Scaling Up Green Finance 1, 6 (Nov. 8, 2018) (transcript
available at https://www.bis.org/review/r181109f.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ULV-S2MW]).
182. See Skinner, supra note 5, at 1301, 1340‒41, 1344‒47 (describing these ideas in depth);
see also GRAHAM STEELE, THE GREAT DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE, A REGULATORY GREEN
LIGHT: HOW DODD-FRANK CAN ADDRESS WALL STREET’S ROLE IN THE CLIMATE CRISIS 14‒
20 (2020); Conny Olovsson, Is Climate Change Relevant for Central Banks, ECON. COMMENTS.
(Sveriges Riksbank, Stockholm, Sweden), Nov. 14, 2018, at 1, 5‒6.
183. Skinner, supra note 5, at 1301. When regulators increase capital requirements for a
certain kind of loan, it tends to disincentivize such lending relative to other kinds of assets.
DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, THE BROOKINGS INST., QUANTIFYING THE EFFECTS ON LENDING OF
INCREASED CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 1 (2009), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/0924_capital_elliott.pdf [https://perma.cc/6V7F-2KPJ]. It is well
understood that increases in capital requirements have an inverse relationship to lending because
higher capital requirements “make it harder for businesses and individuals to obtain loans, raise
the cost of loans, lower the interest rates offered to depositors and other suppliers of funds, and
reduce the market value of the common stock of existing banks.” Id. This empirical observation
motivated the now-famous Modigliani-Miller theorem. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller,
The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261,
288 (1958) (positing that corporations should be indifferent between funding themselves with
debt versus equity under certain conditions); see also Harry DeAngelo & Rene M. Stulz, LiquidClaim Production, Risk Management, and Bank Capital Structure: Why High Leverage Is Optimal
for Banks 5 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2013-03-08, 2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2254998 [https://perma.cc/R4EP-SUCZ]
(discussing the reasons why it is more efficient for a bank to finance its credit investments (i.e.,
loans) with debt than equity).
184. See, e.g., Skinner, supra note 5, at 1337‒41; STEELE, supra note 182, at 16‒17.
185. See, e.g., NETWORK FOR GREENING THE FIN. SYS., A CALL FOR ACTION: CLIMATE
CHANGE AS A SOURCE OF FINANCIAL RISK 13‒17 (2019), https://www.ngfs.net/sites/
default/files/medias/documents/ngfs_first_comprehensive_report_-_17042019_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/HV89-U2JR]; Climate Change, BANK OF ENG., https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
climate-change [https://perma.cc/T6FP-D9N9]; Climate Change and the ECB, EUR. CENT. BANK,
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/climate/html/index.en.html [https://perma.cc/VY5K-L6P9].
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of its mandate.”186 Awash in pressure to do something about the
climate, the Fed has also taken early steps. First, in a November 2020
financial stability report, it indicated that climate change could be a
financial stability risk, thus opening the door to a certain set of policy
tools in a fight against climate change.187 Then, in December 2020, the
Fed joined the Network for Greening the Financial System
(“NGFS”)—a group of central bankers and bank supervisors that are
committed to using central banking tools to mitigate climate change—
a group the Fed had abstained from for several years.188
For the Fed, most climate initiatives sit well outside its mandate
and would therefore require activist central banking.189 Consider
monetary policy first. Green QE is most assuredly outside the Fed’s
section 2A power.190 A program of non-crisis-era asset purchases, like
green QE would be, necessarily would fall to section 14 of the Federal
Reserve Act, which provides authority for open-market operations in
normal times.191 But section 14 does not expressly allow for purchasing
private corporate bonds of any kind, including those that are green.192
While corporate bond purchases might skate through section 13(3) on
a crisis basis, it is another matter altogether to use section 14 as a hook
for making finance greener.193 Notably, unlike the ECB and the Bank
of England, the Fed does not have a secondary mandate in its
constitutive statute that directs the central bank to have regard to the
186. Jens Weidmann, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank and Chair of the Bd. of Dirs. of
the Bank for Int’l Settlements, What Role Should Central Banks Play in Combating Climate
Change, Remarks at the ILF Online-Conference 1 (Jan. 25, 2021) (transcript available at
https://www.bis.org/review/r210128a.pdf [https://perma.cc/AM99-Q69X]).
187. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT:
NOVEMBER 2020, at 58‒59 (2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financialstability-report-20201109.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XYE-KN2R] (implicating that climate change
may pose financial stability risks).
188. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Board
Announces It Has Formally Joined the Network for Greening the Financial System, or NGFS, as
a Member (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/
bcreg20201215a.htm [https://perma.cc/9WK6-VDV5].
189. See Skinner, supra note 5, at 1353‒54.
190. 12 U.S.C. § 225a.
191. Id. § 353.
192. That provision provides a list of the debt securities that the Fed “shall have power” to
buy. Id. § 354. It includes gold, Treasury bonds, bonds guaranteed by a government agency (i.e.,
MBS from the GSEs), municipal bonds, and bonds issued by the now-defunct Home Owners’
Loan Corporation. Id.
193. The justification being that the bond purchases are necessary to ease credit conditions
after a financial crisis. See Skinner, supra note 5, at 1330–31.
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environmental goals of the government.194 The Fed lacks such political
cover.
Regulatory efforts to deter “brown” lending would also smack of
activism.195 Risk weights must be tied to concrete, verifiable, objective
evidence that a particular asset class is truly riskier than another.196 By
that measure, safe assets (like cash and Treasury securities) carry a
zero risk-weight, while a junk bond (lower than BBB) would receive a
risk weight of 75 to 100 percent.197 But much is still uncertain about the
physical and transition risks associated with climate change, such that
accurately specifying what incrementally higher risk-weight would be
appropriate for “brown assets” (relative to others) seems beyond the
Fed’s present expertise.198 Moreover, and perhaps more importantly,
the legislative purpose of capital requirements is to safeguard the
solvency of a bank.199 But today, banks’ exposure to carbon-intensive
industries is a small—and steadily decreasing—aspect of their balance
sheets.200 As an accounting matter, it appears unlikely that any of the
large banks could fail as a result of their carbon-rich loans gone sour—

194. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art.
127, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C326) 102; Bank of England Act 1998, c.11 §§ 2A, 9E (UK).
195. The Fed has legal authority under various pieces of banking legislation—most recently,
the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010—to establish set capital requirements for the bank holding
companies that it oversees. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 171, 124 Stat. 1376, 1435‒39 (2010); see Joseph G. Haubrich, A Brief History of
Bank Capital Requirements in the United States, ECON. COMMENT. (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Cleveland,
Cleveland, O.H.), Feb. 28, 2020, at 1, 4‒5. Still, this may reflect more practice than law.
196. See IRB Approach: Overview and Asset Class Definitions Chapter of Calculation of
RWA for Credit Risk, BIS, https://www.bis.org/basel_framework/chapter/CRE/31.htm
[https://perma.cc/3RQD-BM4H] (summarizing how risk weight formulas work with data points
like probability of default, loss-given-default, and exposure at default).
197. U.S. Basel III Final Rule: Standardized Risk Weights Tool, DAVIS POLK (2016),
http://usbaseliii.com/tool/index.html [https://perma.cc/NUF5-DXJ3] (showing a 0 percent risk
weight when a viewer clicks on “[e]xposures to, and portions of exposures that are directly and
unconditionally guaranteed by, the U.S. government, its agencies and the Federal Reserve”);
Basel III:
Post Crisis Reforms, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/
dam/Deloitte/my/Documents/risk/my-ra-basel-iv-placemat.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3N5-5G45]
(demonstrating a risk weight of 75 percent for bonds ranked BBB+ to BBB-, and risk weights of
100 percent or more for bonds ranked BB+ and below).
198. For a collection of Fed papers on climate and uncertainty, see Douglas Clement,
Uncertainty, Asset Prices, and Policy: Brief Reviews of Seven Conference Papers, FED. RSRV.
BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2019/uncertaintyasset-prices-and-policy [https://perma.cc/T7H8-V5EL].
199. See Bank Holding Company Act 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(A) (grounding capital
requirements in goals of bank safety and soundness).
200. Skinner, supra note 5, at 1318‒19.
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an examination of bank financials shows that even if 100 percent of big
U.S. banks’ wholesale loan exposure to automatable and oil and gas
companies failed, these institutions’ tier 1 equity capital would be three
to four times more than necessary to absorb those cumulative losses.201
Without sufficient grounding in financial risk, the use of regulation
to deter banks from lending to certain kinds of business would be an
activist move for the Fed to make. And it would appear political.202
Without clear evidence that climate change will impact financial assets
in ways that banks are unable to withstand, new climate-related
regulation would force the Fed to make subjective value judgments
about which industries and companies should win or lose in the new
green versus brown equation. Again, such value judgments are for the
political branches, and especially for Congress.
Finally, what of supervision? Fed supervision has always been
flexible, discretion bound, and woolly.203 General language
surrounding a bank’s “safety and soundness” provides the basis for
most microprudential supervision of bank balance sheets, governance,
and operations.204 Meanwhile, general references to “financial
stability” and “systemic risk” in Titles I and II of the Dodd-Frank Act
(combined with the Fed’s historic role as LOLR) are thought to
provide an implied mandate to the Fed to mind the financial stability
of the system as a whole (and thus to engage in macroprudential forms
201. For a collection of this data, see id. at 18. As I acknowledge in this related work, “[o]f
course, in all things, there is a possibility of Knightian uncertainty: the unknown unknown; or, as
Mervyn King and John Kay refer to it, ‘radical uncertainty.’” Id. at 21 n.92 (quoting JOHN KAY
& MERVYN KING, RADICAL UNCERTAINTY (2020)).
202. Notably, when the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) passed a final
rule prohibiting banks from categorically declining credit to certain industries, without a riskbased assessment, in January 2021, there was significant public outcry concerning the interference
of the OCC in banks’ decision-making process. See OCC Fair Access to Financial Services, 12
C.F.R. Part 55 (2020); see, e.g., Jesse Hamilton, Banks Blast Rule That Would Force Lending to
Oil, Gun Firms, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 5, 2021, 11:43 AM) https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2021-01-05/banks-blast-u-s-rule-that-would-force-lending-to-oil-gun-firms [https://
perma.cc/J9MH-XPEW].
203. See Guidance, Supervisory Expectations, and the Rule of Law: How Do the Banking
Agencies Regulate and Supervise Institutions? Hearing on Examining How Banking Agencies
Supervise and Regulate Financial Institutions, How Regulated Institutions Interact with Their
Regulators, and the Congressional Review Act and the Scope of Its Applicability to Agency
Statements of Policy Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Affs., 116th Cong. 4 (2019)
[hereinafter Tahyar Testimony] (statement of Margaret E. Tahyar). The word “supervision” does,
however, appear in the preamble to the Fed. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251,
251 (1913).
204. See 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(A).
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of banking system supervision).205 It is an open secret among Fed
experts and lawyers that these statutes, so broadly worded, give the Fed
considerable latitude to exercise its judgment as to whether any given
bank activity or investment will implicate its ‘safety and soundness’ or
‘financial stability’ overall.
Thus, the risk of supervisory activism toward climate change
exists. While supervision may properly monitor credit risk and the
banks’ efforts to adapt to emerging climate risks,206 it also has potential
to mask efforts to deter politically unpopular kinds of loans through
the use of informal supervisory scolding or “Dear CEO” letters that
can punish or intimidate.207 Going forward, to avoid a charge of
activism, the Fed will have some burden of showing that its supervision
of climate-related risks is narrowly tailored to the risk at hand—and
not an exercise in partisan or politically driven sorting.
*

*

*

By this point, this Article has sketched the landscape of central
bank activism in its various forms. These three case studies of
contemporary and potential Fed activism have suggested some indicia
of the phenomenon. In its hallmark trait, activism features a disconnect
between the statutory power (in text and purpose) and a novel
application of the power. In addition to that disconnect, activism upsets
some structural dynamic, either by:
(1) a reallocating power between the Fed, Congress, and the
executive branch (i.e., the Treasury);
(2) creating openings for political pressure going forward; or
(3) assuming value-judgment-making that is otherwise reserved
for elected officials in the political branches.
The next Part builds on this descriptive analysis by situating
contemporary central bank activism in historical context.

205. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, §§ 111, 203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392, 1450 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301, 5321, 5383).
206. See Letter from Jerome H. Powell, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., to
Brian Schatz (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.schatz.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Chair%
20Powell%20to%20Sen.%20Schatz%204.18.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJT5-XQAV] (conceding
that the Fed supervises all manner of credit risk, including climate risk).
207. See Tahyar Testimony, supra note 204, at 13 (noting the power of suasion supervisors
have over banks).
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II. CENTRAL BANK ACTIVISM IN U.S. HISTORY
As central bank activism looms, lessons once learned from past
episodes of political and monetary activism are now dulled or wholly
forgotten. Revisited, these stories caution against the revival of activist
policies or structures today. This Part considers several significant
cases of central bank activism that transpired between America’s
Founding and 2010, dusting off their lessons. Accordingly, whereas the
cases in Part I allowed us to induce some indicia of central bank
activism—what might it look like today?—the historical cases in Part
II provide some further color on the economic and political
consequences of, and conditions conducive to, activist institutional
behavior.
A. First and Second Banks of the United States
Alexander Hamilton was the first to experiment with central
banking in the United States.208 The United States had significant
economic problems immediately after winning the Revolutionary War.
The first leaders of the nation were faced with a slew of financial
problems such as “re-establishing commerce and industry, repaying
war debt, restoring the value of the currency, and lowering inflation.”209
Inspired by the Bank of England, Hamilton made a proposal to
Congress for a national bank.210 Like other public or proto central
banks of the era, the national bank Hamilton envisioned would be an
institution to support public finance—it would “issue paper money,”
provide a place to store money, “act as the government’s fiscal agent,”
and “offer banking facilities for commercial parties.”211 But it would
also have private elements.212 Congress chartered the Bank of North
America in 1781 (justified as a war exigency)213—and Hamilton

208.

FED. RSRV. BANK PHILA., THE FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED STATES: A CHAPTER IN
HISTORY OF CENTRAL BANKING 1 (2021), https://www.philadelphiafed.org//media/frbp/assets/institutional/education/publications/the-first-bank-of-the-united-states.pdf
[https://perma.cc/53NX-UF3N].
209. Id. at 1.
210. Id. at 2.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. H. Wayne Morgan, The Origins and Establishment of the First Bank of the United States,
30 BUS. HIST. REV. 472, 476 (1956). Hamilton billed the bank as a war measure, writing to the
new Superintendent of Finance, Robert Morris, that
THE
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declared it to be “the best expedient” for the national cause.214 This
bank, however, ran into legal problems involving the legitimacy of its
charter and was reduced to a local Pennsylvania bank by 1790.215
Once appointed Secretary of the Treasury in 1789, Hamilton
realized his dream for a full-fledged national bank—which, in his view,
was a “necessary auxiliary . . . [and] indispensable engine in the
administration of finances.”216 Hamilton’s plan clearly envisioned the
Bank of the United States to be a public finance institution, along the
lines of contemporaneous central banks. Historian Paul Kahan refers
to a letter written by then-Secretary of the Treasury Alexander J.
Dallas in 1815. The letter, though referring to the Second Bank of the
United States, “capture[d] the essence of Hamilton’s vision” for these
public finance institutions.217 In particular, the Bank of the United
States
ought not to be regarded as a commercial bank. It will not operate
upon the funds of the stockholders alone, but much more upon the
funds of the nation. Its conduct, good or bad, will not affect corporate
[a]ll we have to fear is that want of money may disband the army, or . . . create in the
people a general disgust and alarm . . . But if a judicious administration of our finances,
assisted by a bank takes place . . . no convulsion is to be apprehended . . . . Tis by
introducing order into our finances . . . not by gaining battles, that we are finally to gain
our object[, independence].
Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris (Apr. 30, 1781), in THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 1757–1804 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961). Notably, appeals to the
exigencies of war were also made by Congress in connection with the National Bank Acts of 1863
and 1864 which would establish a national banking system for the express purpose of maintaining
a stable currency and bolstering civic confidence in that currency. See John Wilson Million, The
Debate on the National Bank Act of 1863, 2 J. POL. ECON. 251, 256–58, 279–80 (1894). But by that
time, the First (and Second) Banks of the United States ceased to exist (they had not been
rechartered after their terms expired), id. at 262, and the U.S. Federal Reserve System had not
yet been created. So, in this intervening period, Congress turned to private banks to play this role.
See id. at 270. As scholars of the era have remarked, viewing the national banking system as
created to aid the nation in combatting this emergency puts the National Banking Act in its
“proper historical bearing.” Id. at 258; see also Founding of the OCC & the National Banking
System, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/whowe-are/history/founding-occ-national-bank-system/index-founding-occ-national-bankingsystem.html [https://perma.cc/FXD2-ZSZ3].
214. DAVID COWEN & RICHARD SYLLA, ALEXANDER HAMILTON ON FINANCE, CREDIT,
AND DEBT 53 (2018).
215. See JOHN JAY KNOX, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 31–32 (1900).
216. COWEN & SYLLA, supra note 214, at 116; see Joseph H. Sommer, The Birth of the
American Business Corporation: Of Banks, Corporate Governance, and Social Responsibility, 49
BUFF. L. REV. 1011, 1076–88 (2001) (discussing how the national bank facilitated the creation of
the American corporation).
217. PAUL KAHAN, THE BANK WAR 7 (2016).
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credit alone, but must much more the credit and resources of the
government. In fine, it is not an institution created for the purposes
of commerce and profit alone, but much more for the purposes of
national policy, as an auxiliary in the exercise of some of the highest
powers in government.218

In his Report On A National Bank, Hamilton explained the role
he envisioned for the Bank. For one, the Bank would control the
money supply—in his view, the federal government—“of a nature so
liable to abuse”—should not have the power to issue money.219 Rather,
a national bank would have the prudence that was necessary for
adequate restraint.220 The Bank would also play some fiscal roles and
support the government. It would act as the government’s fiscal agent,
storing and transporting specie free of charge, facilitating payments on
and subscriptions for national debt, and even handling payroll for
government employees.221 In addition, the Bank would issue loans to
the government, therein creating public debt,222 and help finance
taxes.223
But the Bank would have a private ownership and governance
structure. The bank would have $10 million of capital; 20 percent of
subscriptions would be held by government and the other 80 percent
by private shareholders.224 In terms of governance, Hamilton also
preferred private over public control: he believed that private directors
would have better incentives flowing “[f]rom the influence of . . . a
desire of enhancing [the bank’s] profits.”225 And he distrusted
governmental motives, asking “what Government ever uniformly
consulted its true interest, in opposition to the temptations of
momentary exigencies? What nation was ever blessed with a constant

218. Id.
219. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, TREASURY DEP’T, REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK 321
(1791).
220. Id. at 313.
221. COWEN & SYLLA, supra note 214, at 120.
222. The bank would give “[g]reater facility to the Government in obtaining pecuniary aids,
especially in sudden emergencies” by perpetually standing ready with a pool of capital that could
be mobilized. Id. at 126.
223. Id. (“Those who are in a situation to have access to the Bank can have the assistance of
loans to answer with punctuality the public calls upon them . . . [and all taxpayers benefit from]
the increasing of the quantity of circulating medium and the quickening of circulation.”).
224. FED. RSRV. BANK PHILA., supra note 208, at 2.
225. HAMILTON, supra note 219, at 326.
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succession of upright and wise Administrators?”226 Here, Hamilton
appears to have identified the time-inconsistent nature of public policy,
stemming from political and electoral cycles. He understood that the
fruits of the Bank’s labor, like monetary stability, were public goods
that had to be produced by a government institution but governed by
actors with the right incentives.227
Importantly, the Bank would also be designed to serve these
private interests. In particular, it would be tasked with assisting “trade
and industry” with “[t]he augmentation of the active or productive
capital of a country,” by enabling “more effective utilization of capital
by which scattered and otherwise idle amounts are concentrated and
made to serve the uses of business.”228
The First Bank opened on December 12, 1791 and had a twentyyear charter.229 But Congress voted not to renew its charter in 1811, and
the First Bank closed.230
Alas, America sorely missed a public finance institution during the
War of 1812. As Professor Larry White explains, “[b]y 1815, the United
States found itself heavily in debt, much like it had been at the end of
the Revolutionary War thirty years earlier.”231 And so a Second Bank
of the United States was chartered in 1816, again for twenty years.232
The Second Bank performed similar functions as the First Bank (and
even engaged in rudimentary monetary policy) and maintained the
226. Id. at 331. Hamilton did, however, reserve certain powers for the Treasury secretary,
such as the power to inspect the bank’s books. JOHN THOM HOLDSWORTH, THE FIRST BANK OF
THE UNITED STATES 20 (1910). Interestingly, this role for the Treasury secretary in the central
banks’ affairs held over in the original Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and was not removed until
1935. Compare Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 10, 38 Stat. 251, 260 (1913) (designating
the secretary of the Treasury as an ex officio member of the Board), with Banking Act of 1935,
Pub. L. No. 74-305, sec. 203(b), 49 Stat. 684, 704 (1935) (designating the composition of the Board
as “seven members, to be appointed by the President”).
227. See KAHAN, supra note 217, at 9 (noting that, what had always made the Bank attractive,
in Hamilton’s view, “was that it sidestepped what he saw as the downside of representative
government, namely, that politicians would be unwilling to make necessary but politically difficult
decisions in times of crisis or that they would be tempted to manipulate the money supply for
short-term political gain”).
228. HAMILTON, supra note 219, at 306; HOLDSWORTH, supra note 226, at 14.
229. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 226, at 20, 29.
230. Id. at 97.
231. See Andrew T. Hill, The Second Bank of the United States, FED. RSRV. HIST. (Dec. 5,
2015), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/second-bank-of-the-us [https://perma.cc/
M9YQ-3SXJ].
232. For a history of the Second Bank, see generally JAY COST, THE PRICE OF GREATNESS
(2018); FED. RSRV. BANK PHILA., supra note 208; KAHAN, supra note 217, at 20.
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same mostly private ownership structure.233 However, the Second Bank
was considerably larger and more powerful234: it had $35 million in
capital and eighteen branches nationally, compared to the eight
possessed by the First Bank.235 But like the First Bank, the Second
Bank’s charter was not renewed upon its expiration and, indeed,
became the subject of considerable political acrimony.
Specifically, the election of Andrew Jackson to the presidency was
fateful for the Second Bank.236 In the so-called “Bank War,” Andrew
Jackson crossed political swords with the then-president of the Second
Bank, Nicholas Biddle. For Jackson, defeating the Bank became part
of his populist, antibank, anti-elitist dogma—and he went to great
lengths to bring the Second Bank to its knees, particularly during his
second term in office.237 Jackson regularly spoke out against the Bank
and, in a final blow in 1833, removed all federal deposits from the Bank
and transferred them to state banks.238 Later, Jackson would order the
Secretary of War to demand that the Bank stop paying pensions to the
Revolutionary War veterans.239
Biddle fought back by inducing a recession (by contracting the
money supply) and refusing to comply with the pension cessation
order.240 But he was no match for Jackson’s antibank fervor. To gain a
233. FED. RSRV. BANK PHILA., supra note 208, at 6.
234. Paul Kahan argues that, by 1829,
the bank originated one out of every five bank loans in the nation and emitted
approximately one-fifth of the country’s bank notes. More impressive, the bank held
one third of the nation’s specie reserves, making it the most important financial
institution in the United States. . . . “[I]ts operations touched virtually every aspect of
the nation’s economic life.”
KAHAN, supra note 217, at 55 (footnote omitted) (quoting Arthur Fraas, The Second Bank of the
United States: An Instrument for an Interregional Monetary Union, 34 J. ECON. HIST. 447, 447
(1974)).
235. Id. at 20.
236. Kahan references a contemporary observer, remarking in 1836, “If any man but Andrew
Jackson had been at the head of the government, the Bank of the United States would still have
been in existence.” Id. at 27–28.
237. See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832) (transcript available at
https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/july-10-1832-bank-veto [https://
perma.cc/C9LU-33RF]). In his judgment, though a national bank may be necessary in principle,
the particular powers Congress endowed in the Second Bank—monopoly; freedom to decide
where to branch based on profit motive, without consulting government; and exemption from
various taxes state banks were subject to—were neither necessary nor proper. Id.
238. COST, supra note 232, at 157.
239. See KAHAN, supra note 217, at 65.
240. See RALPH C. H. CATTERALL, THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 314–21
(1903) (describing how Biddle, in response to Jackson withdrawing government deposits from the
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sense of just how committed Jackson was to destroying the Bank,
historians refer to one particularly illuminating conversation between
Jackson and Martin Van Buren in the summer of 1832: “The bank,”
Jackson began, “is trying to kill me, but I will kill it.”241 Jackson wanted
to turn the question of the Bank’s existence into a popular referendum
on the people versus what he saw as a technocratic elite.242
For students of contemporary central bank activism, the story of
the First and Second Banks offers two cautionary tales. The first is
about the perils of private credit allocation undertaken by a public
finance institution. Both Banks competed with state-chartered banks
and effectively controlled credit conditions in ways that could benefit
their private stockholders. The Second Bank made loans to private
individuals, and, because it received all of the government’s deposits,
had a significant competitive advantage over state banks to make more
loans.243 Writing today, historian Jay Cost analogizes the First and
Second Bank to government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”), Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac; like the GSEs, the two Banks benefited
(perhaps even more so) from the government’s explicit backing.244
The very notion that the Bank could exercise public functions
while serving and being governed by private interests nettled
republican ideals and worried James Madison greatly. Among other
things, Madison warned that “[t]he power of granting charters . . . is a
great and important power.”245 Madison further noted in this regard
that “Public Affairs in Europe” had shown that such a public-private
corporation had the potential to become a “powerful machine . . .
competent to effect objects on principles, in a great measure
independent of the people.”246
Bank and its branches, launched a “reduction in discounts [loans] . . . to the amount of
$13,300,000–a preposterously large sum”). As Andrew Hill notes,
[t]his contraction of credit . . . might create a backlash against Jackson and force the
president to relent and redeposit government funds in the Bank, perhaps even
renewing the charter. But Biddle’s move backfired: in the end, it helped support
Jackson’s claim that the bank had been created to serve the interests of the wealthy,
not to meet the nation’s financial needs.
Hill, supra note 231.
241. KAHAN, supra note 217, at 95.
242. See id. at 102–03.
243. FED. RSRV. BANK PHILA., supra note 208, at 6.
244. COST, supra note 232, at 161.
245. Id. at 65.
246. Id.
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In the end, Madison’s fears of corruption and profligacy
manifested most pointedly in the Second Bank. The Second Bank
opened amidst the economic boom that followed the War of 1812—but
“promptly discredited itself by speculation, stockjobbing, and, at some
branches, outright fraud.”247 And it did a terrible job managing the
panic of 1819. Worried about regional drains of capital, the thenpresident of the Bank, William Jones, ended the practice whereby
notes of one branch could be redeemed at any other; the consequence
was that Western and Southern branches had to reduce their credit,
straining those regions.248 At the same time, Jones required state banks
to resume redeeming notes for specie, which forced those banks to call
in existing loans and reduce new lending.249 When Biddle took over as
president of the Second Bank in 1822, he wrote to President James
Monroe: “The Bank is of vital importance to the finances of the govt.
and an object of great interest to the community. That it has been
perverted to selfish purposes cannot be doubted—that it may—&
must—be renovated is equally certain.”250
But even under Biddle, the institution’s power to further private
interests was too great to resist. As historians at the Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia remarked, “Biddle also wasn’t above allowing the bank
to make loans to his friends while denying loans to those who were
deemed not so friendly.”251 In 1826, for example, Biddle used the
Bank’s economic power to crush a financial empire that had been built
by Jacob Barker when Biddle became worried that Barker’s
institutions had grown too large.252 Ultimately, it seems that the power
to dispense credit selectively, for private or political interests, became
a rallying cry for the Bank’s opponents: most formidably, President
Andrew Jackson.253
The second lesson to be drawn from the First and Second Banks
regards the dangers that presidential populism poses for a technocratic
central bank. Though many ideological battles were waged during the
247. Daniel Feller, King Andrew and the Bank, 29 HUMANITIES, Jan./Feb. 2008,
https://www.neh.gov/humanities/2008/januaryfebruary/feature/king-andrew-and-the-bank
[https://perma.cc/87X5-U2KN].
248. KAHAN, supra note 217, at 25.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 47.
251. FED. RSRV. BANK PHILA., supra note 208, at 14.
252. KAHAN, supra note 217, at 55.
253. See COST, supra note 232, at 156–57.
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Bank War, perhaps the most fundamental clash came over the Bank’s
inclination (and ability) to respond to popular forces. Hamilton never
intended either of the Banks to be overly responsive to the changing
tides of popular or presidential opinion—to the contrary, he designed
the Banks as “a hedge against the unpredictability of democracy.”254
Biddle, who firmly grasped the role of the Bank in American public
life—at least as far as its public policymaking was concerned—was a
steadfast believer in technocracy.255 But Jackson, and those most loyal
to him, preferred a national bank that would appear popularly
accountable while dispensing political patronage to executive
devotees.256 The fact that the Bank had the power to cater to private
interests may well have created a toehold for Jackson to socialize the
idea that the Bank could, and should, be meeting popular demands of
the day. Madison had recognized that danger early on.257 This basic
lesson in republican theory and central banking—that credit allocation
and populism erode technocratic neutrality of a central bank—may
well resonate today and at intervals in the future.
B. The 1920s: Discretionary Monetary Policy
It was not long after the Federal Reserve System (the “System”)
was created that various organs of the System would engage in
monetary policy activism. The original Federal Reserve Act of 1913
had empowered the Fed as first and foremost a bank supervisor and
currency manager.258 At the outset of the 1920s, the macroeconomic
effects of the money supply were still not well understood, and the
expansion and contraction of money were thought to be automatically
managed by international flows of gold and the expansion and
contraction of credit throughout the country pursuant to the so-called
real bills doctrine.259 Monetary policy, as it were, was a passive feature
of the System.

254. KAHAN, supra note 217, at 9.
255. See COST, supra note 232, at 154–55.
256. See KAHAN, supra note 217, at viii, 61–62.
257. See COST, supra note 232, at 64–68.
258. See, e.g., Lev Menand, Why Supervise Banks? The Foundations of the American
Monetary Settlement, 74 VAND. L. REV. 101, 150–52 (2021).
259. See Robert W. Dimand, Competing Visions for the U.S. Monetary System, 1907-1913:
The Quest for an Elastic Currency and the Rejection of Fisher’s Compensated Dollar Rule for Price
Stability, 2003 PAPERS POL. ECON. 101, 102; MELTZER, supra note 79, at 137–90. Robert Hetzel
explains,
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But throughout the 1920s, the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, under the leadership of its president, Benjamin Strong, actively
evolved the System’s objectives and its policy tools. In particular,
Strong believed that the System should steer monetary conditions
toward price stability and aid European economic reconstruction.260
Strong’s activist policies, deployed to achieve those objectives, shaped
the System throughout the 1920s in ways that would bring it closer to
the modern conception of the Federal Reserve System than its framers
had originally designed.261 By 1924, Strong and other senior System
officials had developed an intellectual and policy framework that
would (or already had) inspired and justified proactive uses of
monetary policy.262
Strong also created the institutional and governance structure to
implement his novel policies. He innovated a “Governors’
Committee”—a sort of proto FOMC—that was a consortium of
Reserve Bank presidents that would be tasked with cohering policy
around OMOs and giving the Board policy advice.263 Fortuitously for
Strong, the System had newly acquired access to the raw material with

[t]he founders of the Federal Reserve System had assumed that the Fed would operate
subject to the discipline of the international gold standard . . . . [T]he gold standard was
the accepted means of keeping [the power to control the price level] from the
government . . . . [Policymakers like FRBNY President Benjamin] Strong had more
faith in the automatic operation of a gold standard to limit inflation and to preserve
social stability . . . .
Robert L. Hetzel, The Rules Versus Discretion Debate over Monetary Policy in the 1920s, FED.
RSRV. BANK RICHMOND ECON. REV., Nov./Dec. 1985, at 3, 3, 8. See generally HUMPHREY &
TIMBERLAKE, supra note 21 (2019) (providing an account of the use of the real bills doctrine in
the 1920s and 1930s).
260. LESTER V. CHANDLER, BENJAMIN STRONG, CENTRAL BANKER 198 (1958). In a Letter
from Benjamin Strong to Oliver M. W. Sprague, Nov. 3, 1922, Strong recounts his realization that
the System “could not escape either responsibility for monetary conditions or the necessity of
exercising broad discretion.” Id.
261. As Strong’s only biographer recounts,
[n]o other peacetime period in the history of the System has witnessed a faster
development of both Federal Reserve thinking and policies than that starting around
the end of 1921 and culminating in 1924. At the beginning of this period, Federal
Reserve officials were confused and uncertain as to both ends and means. They were
questioning old objectives and policy guides but had not yet developed new ones; they
neither understood the instruments at their disposal nor were skilled in their use.
Id. at 188.
262. See id. at 189 (“Theirs had now become a philosophy of positive regulation, and they
were consciously using their powers to promote high and stable levels of business activity and
employment, stability of price levels, and European monetary reconstruction.”).
263. See id. at 187, 216.
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which it could conduct such offensive monetary policy. Thanks to the
Treasury’s wartime bond programs, there were more government debt
assets in circulation than ever before, at levels now sufficient to enable
the System’s first efforts at OMOs.264 The Governor’s Committee
experimented with OMOs to “prevent undesirable effects” on the
economy, from things such as gold movements or currency outflows,
and also “dynamically” to effectuate changes in the money market.265
Strong turned to proactive monetary policy to solve at least two
major economic issues of the day—one domestic and one abroad. At
home, gold inflows had created the potential to adversely impact price
levels. Between 1920 and 1924, monetary gold stock in the United
States rose to 70 percent, sparking fears of inflation and subsequent
deflation.266 To counter inflationary pressures, the New York Fed
responded decisively to defend the gold reserve ratio.267 Strong’s
formula was to “sterilize” gold inflows.268 This is to say that the System
would “offset” gold inflows by taking other money out of circulation
(e.g., by selling government securities and / or reducing discount
window lending).269 The use of OMOs to pursue this rudimentary form

264. Id. at 205, 208 (discussing Strong’s early discovery, experimentation, and learning curve
with open market operations).
265. Id. at 234. The reader may be interested to know that Strong’s committee was disbanded
by the Fed Board in 1923 while he was in Colorado recuperating from tuberculosis. Id. at 221–23;
see MELTZER, supra note 79, at 149–50 (detailing how a 1923 Board resolution abolished the
Committee on Centralized Purchases and Sales, which Strong had founded outside of the Board’s
reach, and appointed the five members of that committee to the Open Market Investment
Committee (“OMIC”), which was firmly “under the Board’s control”). So it would not have
played a role in monetary policy decisions after that time. Also of note is that the OMIC, which
Strong continued to serve on, played a major role in monetary policy after 1923, see Hetzel, supra
note 259, at 3 n.2, 4, 5, even when the Committee on Centralized Purchases and Sales no longer
existed.
266. LIAQUAT AHAMED, LORDS OF FINANCE: THE BANKERS WHO BROKE THE WORLD
162–63 (2009).
267. See Priscilla Roberts, Benjamin Strong, the Federal Reserve, and the Limits to Interwar
American Nationalism: Part I: Intellectual Profile of a Central Banker, FED. RSRV. BANK
RICHMOND ECON. Q., Spring 2000, at 61, 90.
268. Leland Crabbe, The International Gold Standard and U.S. Monetary Policy From World
War I to The New Deal, 75 FED. RSRV. BULL. 423, 428 (1989). At least one scholar, however,
doubts whether Strong was acting to stabilize the price level. See David Glasner, The Great, but
Misguided, Benjamin Strong Goes Astray in 1928, UNEASY MONEY (June 24, 2015),
https://uneasymoney.com/2015/06/24/the-great-but-misguided-benjamin-strong-goes-astray-in1928 [https://perma.cc/QH2W-84MZ].
269. David C. Wheelock, Conducting Monetary Policy Without Government Debt: The Fed’s
Early Years, FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS, May/June 2002, at 1, 6 n.24. Sterilization works as
follows: when gold flows in, the System can sell assets in the open market, which will reduce the
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of price stability expanded the then common understanding of section
14 of the Federal Reserve Act. As one former Fed official has
remarked, “the provisions of the Federal Reserve Act permitting the
Reserve Banks to acquire government securities were little more than
an afterthought” to the Act’s framers.270
Strong’s correspondence suggests that his initiative to sterilize
gold not only stretched legislative purpose, but it also pushed the
boundaries of the Fed Board’s own policy. In a June 28, 1923, letter to
Professor Charles J. Bullock, Strong explained:
If I were Czar of the Federal Reserve System I’d see that the total of
our earning assets did not go much above or below their past year’s
average, after deducting an amount equaling from time to time our
total new gold imports. This is the song I’ve been singing in
Washington since April 1922 with but moderate success. Most of them
don’t see the point about gold!271

Congress had, at various intervals, tried to legislate a price stability
mandate for the Fed during much of the 1920s.272 But the bills met
considerable resistance from various Fed members, including and
especially Benjamin Strong.273 In Strong’s words: “If you will let me
alone I will try to do the best I can but if you make me do by law what
I am trying to do without legislative control, I will be so afraid that I
cannot fill the bill that I will not accept responsibility.”274 Discretion to
engage in activism was preferable in Strong’s opinion.275
money supply thereby offsetting the increase in the money supply that the additional gold will
have created. See Roberts, supra note 267, at 90.
270. Wheelock, supra note 269, at 6. Strictly speaking, the original intention behind section
14 was to allow the Fed to invest excess cash in government securities. See Sastry, supra note 51,
at 6.
271. See CHANDLER, supra note 260, at 191.
272. See, e.g., MELTZER, supra note 79, at 190–92; Stabilization: Hearing on H.R. 11806
Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 70th Cong. 1–2 (1928).
273. Testimony from the Fed board members contributed to the failure of a 1928 bill that
would have formally added price stability as a goal. See MELTZER, supra note 79, at 187–92.
274. Thomas F. Cargill, Irving Fisher Comments on Benjamin Strong and the Federal Reserve
in the 1930s, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1273, 1274 (1992) (quoting Letter from Irving Fisher to Clark
Warburton (July 23, 1946)); see also Roberts, supra note 267, at 93 (“Although Strong doggedly
resisted attempts to pass legislation demanding that the Federal Reserve System employ rate
policy and open market operations to ensure price stability, preferring that Federal Reserve
officials should be allowed to use their discretion in attaining this objective, it was a goal he
broadly shared.”).
275. In all fairness to Strong, an equally significant motivation could have been a desire to
protect the Fed from political attacks, should it fail to achieve the perfect price stability that

SKINNER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

CENTRAL BANK ACTIVISM

10/22/2021 9:59 AM

305

European economic reconstruction was the second policy
problem that Strong addressed with activist monetary policy. He, like
other members of the New York financial elite at the time, believed in
“internationalist” central banking policies and particularly those which
would support a postwar international economic order with America
and England at the helm.276 He viewed it as an obligation of the System
to aid the allies in their postwar rehabilitation.277 However, discerning
this role for the Fed required an activist interpretation of the Federal
Reserve Act. To that end, Strong, along with Fed architect Paul
Warburg, “waged a persistent battle as to whether Federal Reserve
regulations should be framed and interpreted in such a way as to
facilitate the Allies’ ability to finance their war purchases in the
American market.”278
Perhaps most concretely, Strong used a monetary policy tool
already at his disposal—the discount rate—to assist Britain to return
to the Gold Standard.279 Britain was facing a balance of payments
problem that inhibited its ability to restore the prewar parity it so
desired.280 Strong wanted to assist Britain and the Bank of England by
lowering the Reserve Banks’ discount rate, which would make the
“dollar and sterling respectively less and more attractive,” thereby
driving up the value of sterling.281
Yet the System was divided. From a domestic standpoint, many in
the Fed wished to tighten rates in order to dampen what seemed to be
an impending equity bubble fueled by rampant speculation in the stock
market.282 Ultimately, the New York Reserve Bank and eight others
lowered rates by .5 percent, while the Chicago, San Francisco,
Minneapolis, and Philadelphia banks split out of fear of fanning the
flames of speculation.283 Many in the System saw these rate reductions
proposed mandates would require. This motivation would have centered on fundamental
uncertainty—it was unclear whether the Fed could even achieve price stability, yet elements of
Congress wanted to rush to hammer out an ironclad price stability mandate. Glasner, supra note
268 and accompanying text.
276. Roberts, supra note 267, at 63–64.
277. See id.
278. Id. at 72.
279. Id. at 78. For Britain, the ability to return to prewar parity was a matter of economic and
national pride and prestige. See id. at 91.
280. Crabbe, supra note 268, at 423–40.
281. Roberts, supra note 267, at 78–79; see id. at 430–31.
282. MELTZER, supra note 79, at 226–27.
283. See id. at 227–50. For an account of these events, see Roberts, supra note 267, at 78–81.
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as activist insofar as the decision broke with settled understanding of
when the Fed should seek to ease credit conditions. Specifically, it
irritated members of the Federal Reserve Board, who believed that
the committee of governors had overstepped its authority. Several
members of the Board also opposed open market purchases,
especially in 1927, on economic grounds. Most members of the Board,
and officials of some Reserve Banks, believed that Federal Reserve
credit should be extended only at the initiative of member
commercial banks through the rediscounting of commercial and
agricultural loans. Otherwise, those officials argued, the Fed risked
contributing to speculative activities that could prove harmful to the
economy.284

There may well have been legitimate reasons to ease credit
conditions that were separate from foreign affairs. After all, the United
States had been recovering from a mild recession in 1926.285 Yet it does
seem that Strong was principally influenced by financial unease abroad
and, in particular, the Bank of England’s crisis.286 Strong believed it a
crucial duty of the Fed to ensure that Britain could recommit to the
gold standard and restore prewar parity to the pound.287 In 1931,
Russell Leffingwell wrote to Thomas W. Lamont, that “Monty” had
“called upon Ben to defend [her gold] by making it cheaper in
America. This Ben did for Monty consistently and persistently, and

284. Wheelock, supra note 269, at 6–7.
285. MELTZER, supra note 79, at 215–17. In a 1926 report to the Board of Governors, Strong
argued that “[s]hould we go into a business recession while the member banks were continuing
to borrow . . . we should consider taking steps to relieve some of the pressure which this borrowing
induces by purchasing government securities and thus enabling member banks to reduce their
indebtedness.” MELTZER, supra note 79, at 212–13; see also MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA
JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1857-1960, at 269
(1963) (agreeing with others “who concluded that foreign considerations were seldom important
in determining the policies followed but were cited as additional justification for policies adopted
primarily on domestic grounds whenever foreign and domestic considerations happened to
coincide”).
286. See, e.g., Letter from Benjamin Strong to G. L. Harrison (May 15, 1926), https://
fraser.stlouisfed.org/archival-collection/papers-benjamin-strong-jr-1160/foreign-countries473581 [https://perma.cc/9GYD-KACB]; Letter from Benjamin Strong to G. L. Harrison (July
29, 1926), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/archival-collection/papers-benjamin-strong-jr-1160/
foreign-countries-473617 [https://perma.cc/MRC4-7EDR].
287. Roberts, supra note 267, at 64, 67, 78–79.
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successfully until the return of France to the gold standard in 1927 . . .
.”288
Still, it became a widely held belief that Strong’s decision to lower
rates in 1927 damaged the U.S. economy in the years that followed. In
1931, Adolph Miller, a then-member of the Fed Board, would testify
that he believed the 1927 open market operations were the
greatest and boldest operation ever undertaken by the Federal
Reserve System, and, in my judgment, resulted in one of the most
costly errors committed by it or any banking system in the last 75
years . . . . That was a time of business recession. Business could not
use and was not asking for increased money at that time.289

Others joined in Miller’s assessment, with the view that Strong’s 1927
open market operations, and the rate reduction they occasioned, did in
fact contribute to the speculative bubble that would become the great
Stock Market Crash of 1929.290
In summary, the story of the Fed’s 1920 activism mainly features
Benjamin Strong, whose visions of price stability and internationalism
led him to push wider interpretations of sections 14 and 13(2). In regard
to Strong’s discount window policies, the discretion in those provisions’
language makes it difficult to know fully the reasons behind the 1924
and 1927 rate reductions. That opacity has been unhelpful to his legacy.
Some judge Strong’s policies as those that were ultimately guided by a
sense of “economic nationalis[m]”; yet many others lay the Great
Depression at his feet.291 The 1920s’ story may, as such, provide a lesson
for both Congress and Fed leaders in the urgency of coupling robust
mechanisms for transparency and accountability alongside broad
grants of discretion. This period may also be seen as a warning
concerning Reserve Banks’ discretion over discount window policy,
and collateral especially.

288. Id. at 87–88 (“Monty” is Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England; “Ben” is
Benjamin Strong; Russell Leffingwell and Thomas W. Lamont were American bankers).
289. Wheelock, supra note 269, at 10.
290. Id.
291. Compare Roberts, supra note 267, at 81–86, 97 (claiming that “Benjamin Strong who, in
his support of the fateful decision in 1928 to raise interest rates and force a monetary contraction
to bring down stock prices, was an economic nationalist”), with id. at 77–78 (noting that President
Hoover repeatedly blamed the Great Depression on Strong’s policies of discount rate reduction).
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C. The 1970s: Stop-Go Inflation
Fast-forwarding fifty years, the Fed’s attention to presidential and
popular pressure in the early 1970s may also, in that sense, be seen as
a period of activism. The period between 1965 and 1982 is now referred
to as “The Great Inflation, during which period inflation rose above 10
percent in 1974 and 1980.”292 The decade warrants careful study as the
only “peacetime outburst of inflation” that had occurred at the time.293
What role did activism play in contributing to the “disarray” in
monetary policy that could not—or would not—curb inflation?294
There were various pressures in the political economy of the day
that took the Fed’s attention away from fighting inflation. For one, on
a theoretical level, anti-inflationary sentiment had gone out of fashion
among those in a position to influence policy. As Professor John Taylor
points out, Milton Friedman seemed to be alone among professional
economists urging inflation as a “disease” that needed to be reduced.295
Meanwhile, others in the field of professional economics snickered at
the thought. At the 1974 White House Economics Conference on
inflation, economists dismissed the idea of constraining economic
activity in the interest of reining in inflation: famed-economist Paul
Samuelson quipped that the United States did not need a “Winston
Churchill” style “‘blood, sweat, and tears’ program to reduce
inflation.”296
Instead, it had become much more popular to focus on
employment. In retrospect, however, the desire to “squeeze” more
than was structurally possible on that front (i.e., driving unemployment
to below 3 percent) may have been a significant contributing factor to

292. Goodfriend, supra note 175, at 1; see Michael Bryan, The Great Inflation: 1965–1982,
FED. RSRV. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great-inflation
[https://perma.cc/8EWK-7M9K].
293. J. Bradford DeLong, America’s Peacetime Inflation: The 1970s, in REDUCING
INFLATION: MOTIVATION AND STRATEGY 247, 247 (Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer eds.,
1996).
294. Goodfriend, supra note 175, at 1; see also ATHANASIOS ORPHANIDES, BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., MONETARY POLICY RULES AND THE GREAT INFLATION
1 (2002), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2002/200208/200208pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BV99-GZGR] (noting that with the exception of the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Great
Inflation of the 1970s is generally viewed as the most dramatic failure of macroeconomic policy
in the United States since the founding of the Federal Reserve).
295. DeLong, supra note 293, at 279.
296. Id.
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inflation.297 As Professor Brad DeLong writes, it took most of the 1970s
“to persuade economists, and policymakers, that ‘frictional’ and
‘structural’ unemployment were far more than 1–2 percent of the labor
force. . . . [And] that the political costs of even high single-digit
inflation were very high.”298 The popularity of an economic thought,
rather than measures of pure technocracy, may have influenced Fed
policy.
Setting economic fashions to one side, overt political pressure also
played a role. Under the leadership of Fed Chair Arthur Burns, the
Fed appeared to respond, with monetary policy, to popular opinion
and the wishes of President Richard Nixon.299 With regard to the latter,
the Fed’s policy seemed to fluctuate in response to the public’s
“shifting” concern between inflation and unemployment. In particular,
the Fed adopted a so-called “go-stop” monetary policy,300 toggling
between policies aimed at employment and those at inflation. The Fed
would press “go” on monetary loosening, until popular concerns about
inflation mounted; it would then pump the brakes to “stop” inflation
from rising with “aggressive interest rate policy.”301 But, because the
public would not support interest rate increases once employment
begins to rise, the Fed found itself in a political trap of facilitating
creeping inflation.302
Naturally, this kind of waffling monetary policy skewed
expectations about inflation, which in turn, drove inflation up further.
Problematically,
[w]age and price setters learned to take advantage of tight labor
and product markets in the “go” phase of the policy cycle to make
increasingly inflationary demands, which neutralized the monetary
stimulus. As a result, central banks became ever more expansionary
in the pursuit of low unemployment. . . . By pursuing low
unemployment and fighting inflation only when it became the

297. Id. at 273.
298. Id. at 251 (emphasis omitted).
299. Id. at 263.
300. Goodfriend, supra note 175, at 48. Apparently, however, Nixon did not believe he could
control inflation. See Robert L. Hetzel, Arthur Burns and Inflation, FED. RSRV. BANK
RICHMOND ECON. Q., Winter 1998, at 21, 22.
301. Goodfriend, supra note 175, at 48.
302. Id. at 48–49.
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predominant public concern, central banks then increased the
volatility of both inflation and output.303

Precisely as this Fed Board researcher concludes, “had policymakers
concentrated their efforts on safeguarding price stability alone, better
outcomes for both employment and price stability would have been
likely.”304
Moreover, the Fed’s then-Chair, Arthur Burns, directly
accommodated President Nixon. Tapes between Nixon and Burns
feature Nixon pressuring Burns into running an expansionary
monetary policy to boost his reelection prospects.305 Burns often
agreed to the President’s requests. As one example of these
interactions, in a December 10, 1971, tape, Nixon and Burns are
recorded conversing as follows:
Burns: “I wanted you to know that we lowered the discount rate . . .
got it down to 4.5 percent.”
Nixon: “Good, good, good . . . . You can lead ‘em. You can lead ‘em.
You always have, now. Just kick ‘em in the rump a little.”
Burns: “Time is getting short. We want to get this economy going.”306

In another, Nixon chuckles at Fed independence. To Burns, he says,
I know there’s the myth of the autonomous Fed . . . [short laugh] and
when you go up for confirmation some Senator may ask you about
your friendship with the President. Appearances are going to be
important, so you can call Ehrlichman to get messages to me, and he’ll
call you.307

Burns’ leadership certainly seems to teach a lesson in the wisdom of
staying an apolitical course—popular or presidential pressure may be

303.
304.

Id. at 49.
ORPHANIDES, supra note 294, at 8. See generally GEORGE P. SHULTZ & JOHN B.
TAYLOR, CHOOSE ECONOMIC FREEDOM: ENDURING POLICY LESSONS FROM THE 1970S AND
1980S (2020) (discussing the economic policy failures of that era). Interestingly, though, Burns
very much wanted Nixon to let monetary policy alone and try doing something on the economic
policy front to tackle stagflation. See Letter from Arthur Burns to Richard Nixon (June 22, 1971),
in SHULTZ & TAYLOR, supra, at app. B (“I doubt if we will bring inflation under control, or even
get a satisfactory expansion going, without a major shift in economic policy.”).
305. See Burton A. Abrams, How Richard Nixon Pressured Arthur Burns: Evidence from the
Nixon Tapes, 20 J. ECON. PERSPS. 177, 178 (2006).
306. Id. at 181.
307. DeLong, supra note 293, at 259.
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a palliative for Fed leaders in the short term, but it is a dangerous
monetary cocktail for the long term.308 It also highlights once again how
the Fed’s broad grants of discretion may make it difficult to detect
policy decisions that are more political than technocratic.309 Now, to be
fair, the Fed did not gain a formal mandate to maintain price stability
until 1977—so it did not shirk a legal obligation when it let stable prices
slide.310 Nevertheless, Fed policies that are shaped in view of economic
groupthink, popular opinion, or presidential priorities do check the
box for activism—at least as far as its structural indicia go.
*

*

*

Activism, as Parts I and II have shown, is not a monolithic
concept—the cases do not all fit one tidy archetype. Sometimes
activism happens in “wartime” (crisis mode) while in other cases
activism has or could transpire during a “peacetime” transformation of
the Fed. Still, these cases all hang together by their trademark
characteristics and structural impacts: by pushing text, purpose, or
conventional usage of a power—in response to popular, political, or
international pressure—activism enlarges the Fed’s role relative to the
job that Congress gave it. Still, normative judgments of these cases may
well vary. As the final Part discusses, activism can be evaluated along
a spectrum—with crisis-era action on the one end and social
policymaking on the other.
III. ASSESSING CENTRAL BANK ACTIVISM
By now this Article has set out a range of examples where the Fed
(or actors within the institution) have or might one day engage in
“activism.” These studies have indicated a Fed policy as “activist”
when it breaks from statutory text, purpose, or historical usage of a
power; and disrupts structural divisions between the Fed and more
democratically responsive actors. The lessons learned were broad. Part

308. The dynamic of conflicting interests between elected politicians and monetary policy is
a timeless one. As Holland describes, “Driven by election timetables or other short-term goals,
[politicians will] splash too much of what feels like free cash around the economy. History is full
of examples, from Germany’s Weimar Republic a century ago to Latin America today, of the
disastrous effects of losing monetary discipline.” Holland, supra note 75.
309. Indeed, “[t]he period is often cited as a prime example of the dangers associated with
discretion.” ORPHANIDES, supra note 294, at 1.
310. DeLong, supra note 293, at 271. DeLong suggests that Fed Chair Arthur Burns did not
believe he had the authority to quickly bring inflation down. Id. at 250–51.
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II demonstrated that the practical dangers of Fed activism range from
monetary policy failures to popular antipathy, reminding us that
politics and central banking do not go well together.
This Part addresses the sticky normative questions that follow:
What are the reasons why central bank activism should generally be
constrained? Could central bank activism ever be justifiable? And, of
key importance, what guardrails should be sought for navigating
between modernizing adaptation or wartime agility on the one hand,
and activism that overreaches on the other?
A. Legitimacy Concerns
This Article has thus far mainly wrestled with the question of what
the law empowers the Fed to do. Yet to understand fully the problems
with the practice of activism, one must consider the ancillary question
of legitimacy, which speaks to the Fed’s authority to push on the edges
of the law or go beyond them.
As scholars have elsewhere discussed at length, legitimacy matters
a great deal for central banking power. Former Deputy Governor of
the Bank of England, Sir Paul Tucker, studies the question of central
bank legitimacy at length in his book, Unelected Power.311 So, too, have
Professors Charles Goodhart and Rosa Lastra in exploring the nexus
between populism and legitimacy.312 In all of these scholars’ views,
legitimacy is a first-order question for any adjunct of the state that
exercises power on a delegated and independent—and thus
attenuated—basis, as most central banks do.313 Legitimacy forms the
basis for societal “acceptance” of any given power.314 As Tucker
explains, acceptance means that people will “go along with the
decisions and with the right of the central bank to make them . . . [and]
not systemically get in the way of the implementation of agency policy
. . . or otherwise seek to undermine” the institution.315 Acceptance thus

311. See generally TUCKER, supra note 25.
312. Charles Goodhart & Rosa Lastra, Populism and Central Bank Independence, 29 OPEN
ECON. REV. 49, 50, 53–58 (2018).
313. Id. at 54.
314. As Tucker explains, legitimacy thus allows the coercive power of the state to fade into
the background, and it also makes it possible to explain how the central bank may affect its
purpose without extracting some moral duty to obey from people. See TUCKER, supra note 25, at
148.
315. Id. at 155.
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becomes necessary for a central bank to sustain its grip on power and
a linchpin for the efficacy of its policy.
But in some cases, Fed activism could be at odds with its continued
legitimacy.316 To see why, it is useful to lean again on Paul Tucker’s
analysis. In explaining the conditions necessary for the legitimate
exercise of power, Tucker refers to the work of British social scientist
David Beetham.317 The Tucker-Beetham view sets up three conditions
necessary to “justify” as legitimate any given exercise of power318: that
it be “established and exercised” (1) “by legally valid means”; (2)
“under laws, norms, and conventions that conform to a society’s deep
values and normative beliefs about governance”; (3) pursuant to some
“collective acceptance” of the practice.319
The first condition is straightforward enough to consider where
activism is concerned. Whether the Fed is acting within the bounds of
what the law says and what it intended is a question of what Lastra and
Goodhart refer to as “formal legitimacy.”320 Activism, in its strongest
forms, cannot comport with this condition. Even in its milder versions,
activism seems generally at odds with the notion that any use of power
has been established through “legally valid means.”321 Activism, after
all, comes about from subtle (or, sometimes overt) aggrandizements of
power that result from the Fed’s specific efforts to expand a flexible,
broadly worded mandate. While Congress allows administrative
agencies to interpret their own mandates to some extent, there is
always a line that, once crossed, violates the limits to how far any
agency can go in this regard.322
For example, efforts to retool monetary policy to offensively
reduce climate change would, if that came to pass, fall on the other side

316. For a discussion of the legitimacy of the Fed, in light of growing pressure to engage in
activism, see generally Carola C. Binder & Christina P. Skinner, The Legitimacy of the Federal
Reserve (July 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
317. See TUCKER, supra note 25, at 159–60.
318. Id. at 147 (quoting moral philosopher Bernard Williams for the principle that “[t]he
Basic Legitimation Demand implies . . . the state . . . hav[ing] to offer a justification of its power
to each subject”).
319. Id. at 159–60. This conception thus combines legal legitimacy with notions of democratic
legitimacy.
320. Goodhart & Lastra, supra note 312, at 54.
321. See TUCKER, supra note 25, at 159.
322. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“If
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority
to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”).
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of that line. Again, it is difficult to establish that Congress had climate
mitigation in mind with section 2A; accordingly, in the absence of
congressional instruction to “have regard” to climate policy of the
government (as the ECB and Bank of England have),323 a Fed initiative
to take on climate change in that way would seem inconsistent with this
first condition of legitimacy.324
As regards the second condition, activism may also come in
conflict with the well-established principle of democratic governance
that only elected leaders decide which goals the government pursues
and establish laws that seek those ends.325 But when a central bank
engages in activism it substitutes its unelected power—to borrow
Tucker’s term—for the power of the legislature to decide what law and
its design should be. Several of the case studies above demonstrate how
the Fed’s broadly worded legal authorities render it susceptible to
popular or political pressure to sidestep an inert or indecisive
Congress.326
The Fed does not itself share legislative power with Congress
where its own mandate amendments are concerned. Congress should
not put the Fed in the uncomfortable position of acting like a
supralegislature, as it forces the central bank to substitute unelected

323. See note 194 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Rosa M. Lastra & Kern Alexander, The
ECB Mandate: Perspectives on Sustainability and Solidarity, 2020 MONETARY DIALOGUE
PAPERS 1, 11–13, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/648813/
IPOL_IDA(2020)648813_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/F23N-LRKC].
324. As Goodhart and Lastra point out, this can also be problematic for accountability
reasons. If the Fed decides for itself what goals to pursue, how can one know whether they “are
on the right track”? Instead, society must default to deference to their expert technocracy.
Goodhart & Lastra, supra note 312, at 55–56.
325. The notion that “people . . . being able to shape and challenge (or contest) public policy”
reflects a republican ideal of government, with roots in “Rome, the late-medieval Italian citystates, English seventeenth-century debates, and America’s founding fathers . . . . Power is to be
dispersed, office held temporarily, and officeholders accountable.” TUCKER, supra note 25, at
165. Translating these republican notions to central banking terms, as Ben Bernanke has
remarked, there is “[a] broad consensus . . . around the world that the goals of monetary policy
should be established by the political authorities, but that the conduct of monetary policy in
pursuit of those goals should be free from political control.” Ben S. Bernanke, Central Bank
Independence, Transparency, and Accountability, Speech at the Institute for Monetary and
Economic Studies International Conference (May 25, 2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/bernanke20100525a.htm [https://perma.cc/NLY9-Z3YN]. This second prong
of legitimacy also implies some requirement of political independence for the Fed, which will be
discussed in further depth below.
326. See supra notes 148–179 and accompanying text (discussing the Fed’s new monetary
policy framework).
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judgment for that of Congress and to make political decisions about
where scarce governmental resources should be allocated.
And quite often, activist policies will require significant value
judgments, further clashing with condition two. Where green policies
are concerned, for instance, the Fed would need to make decisions
about which companies classify as “brown” or “green” for purposes of
adjusting risk-based capital requirements, chastising banks for holding
certain assets, or for engaging in green QE. Meanwhile, the new policy
framework invites the FOMC to make a number of such decisions—
answering, for example, how far past 2 percent inflation will the
economy be permitted to go, and how will the FOMC satisfy itself that
employment conditions are sufficiently strong (and for which segments
of the population) before it allows liftoff to occur? Will this be a
moving target?327 It bears repeating that politicization of the discount
window has been difficult to sustain in periods before.328 Of course, the
active exercise of discretion is not a litmus test for activism. But
discarding a monetary policy rule in favor of a capacious standard
certainly opens the door to eventual activist applications.
The third condition of “collective acceptance” is more difficult to
pin down against central bank activism. One can point to the popular
desire to tackle climate change and inequality, and to foster collegial
relations with our allies, as goals so important as to justify Fed
intervention even absent clear law. While tempting at first blush, it puts
the cart before the horse. That initial question of what society deems
important should not be up to the Fed’s perception of social mores of
the time. This circles back to conditions one and two. Yet the notion
that there is a ‘collective’ will driving the Fed forward seems to be the
implicit rationale for much of the central bank’s (potential) activism
today. In summary, as measured against these three criteria, certain
versions of central bank activism would not often appear to meet the
conditions necessary for legitimacy.

327. See Tyler Powell & David Wessel, What Do Changes in the Fed’s Longer-Run Goals and
Monetary Strategy Statement Mean?, BROOKINGS (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/up-front/2020/09/02/what-do-changes-in-the-feds-longer-run-goals-and-monetary-strategystatement-mean [https://perma.cc/7X2Z-RAFQ] (noting that the new framework “does not
specify over what period of time the Fed will seek to have inflation average 2 percent or how
much over 2 percent it intends to push inflation as part of this ‘make-up’ strategy”).
328. See Charles W. Calomiris, Is the Discount Window Necessary? A Penn Central
Perspective, 76 FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 31, 31 (1994).
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Of course, a central bank can muddle through periods of low
legitimacy. Take the activist monetary policy of the 1970s as one
example—those policies were soon seen as clearly ineffective, but the
institution carried on.329 But when activism mixes with the wrong
political economy, it can pose a more existential threat. This was the
lesson of the Second Bank of the United States330—and indeed, the Fed
is not immune to such popular hostility today.331
In turn, the popular antipathy that can result from low legitimacy
can create problems for transparency. If central banks become unduly
worried about public censure, their leaders may develop incentives to
obfuscate their actions to conceal the weak basis of their power.
Indeed, the decisions of former New York Fed President Benjamin
Strong typify this point. Recall that Strong resisted clear lines from
Congress, or open deliberation, in the interest of his ability to retain
the autonomy to be activist.332 Such opacity is, of course, inversely
related to accountability. Activism can thus create a spiral of
diminishing
legitimacy,
reduced
transparency,
weakened
accountability, and ultimately, the erosion of authority.
Finally, and shifting gears, aside from the relationship between
activism and legitimacy, activism can also affect a central bank’s
329. See supra notes 299–304 and accompanying text.
330. Referring to the founding of the National Bank system in 1864, one scholar reflected on
the First and Second Banks and the danger of politicization, noting that
[a]s compared with the Second Bank of the United States, the system now to be
inaugurated looked very formidable. If the Second Bank was discontinued for fear of
its becoming a dangerous political weapon, how much more ought one to hesitate
before the inauguration of a similar system on a much larger scale.
Million, supra note 213, at 251, 274.
331. In 2013, knee-deep in QE, the Fed’s popularity was quite low. See Jeffrey M. Jones &
Lydia Saad, Americans Sour on IRS, Rate CDC and FBI Most Positively, GALLUP (May 23, 2013),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/162764/americans-views-irs-sharply-negative-2009.aspx [https://
perma.cc/GHZ9-YUTS] (noting that the Fed has a less positive image than before, with only 33
percent voting for excellent or good performance). Additionally, there have been repeated calls—
on the left and right of the political spectrum—for greater transparency at the Fed. See, e.g.,
Federal Reserve Transparency Act, S. 148, 116th Cong. (2019) (commonly known as “Audit the
Fed”). Other government officials, like former FDIC chair Sheila Bair, have also called for a
reckoning of the Fed, on the ground that it has amassed too much power and exercises that power
beyond its capabilities. See Sheila Bair, Opinion, Overreliance on the Fed Is Compromising the
Future for Millennials, CNBC (Apr. 14, 2020, 6:01 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/13/oped-overreliance-on-the-fed-is-compromising-millennials-future.html [https://perma.cc/4NUMVGWY] (opining that “our elected officials have ceded too much responsibility for the economy
to the Federal Reserve. But the Fed is not well equipped for this role. It is essentially a big bank,
primarily configured to lend to other big banks”).
332. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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independence—both operational and political. Today, most central
banks enjoy a significant degree of political independence—that is, a
sustained commitment from the political branches (especially the
executive branch) to abstain from pressuring the central bank to
fashion policies for the purpose of supporting the government’s
popularity or prerogatives more broadly.333 However, when the Fed
engages in activism, it breaches the conventional barriers between
branches. As discussed above, by too actively interpreting a mandate—
so as to enlarge it in substance and scope—the Fed adopts a legislative
role. Benjamin Strong did this in the 1920s by innovating a price
stability role, fifty years before Congress would give the Fed that job.334
Also at times with activism, the Fed can cross into the executive
branch’s arena by playing an outsized fiscal role.335
Playing fast and loose with the separation of powers stands to
make the Fed vulnerable to political or partisan pressure in the future.
Heading too far—and too often—down fiscal roads could return the
Fed to its pre-1951 role that was highly subservient to Treasury. As will
be recalled, prior to 1951, the Treasury was successful, again and again,
at pressuring the Fed to manipulate interest rates to serve the
government’s need for generous war financing—even well after both
World Wars had ended.336 Falling back into such rhythm could happen
easily where the Fed plays a consistent fiscal role.337 The Federal
333. See, e.g., Salib & Skinner, supra note 27, at 908–09 (noting that the Bank of England is
independent from political influence); Rosa Maria Lastra, The Independence of the European
System of Central Banks, 33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 475, 475–76 (1992) (discussing the independence of
the European System of Central Banks). It bears emphasizing again that the Fed has a relatively
much stronger political independence than several European counterparts, like the ECB and the
Bank of England; as those foreign central banks are explicitly mandated to have regard to
government policy. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 267–270 and accompanying text. Looking ahead, should the Fed pursue
green policies, it would again usurp lawmaking power.
335. Allocating credit, along the lines of a permanent QE, is the prime example. Notably,
there is also practical significance to political pressure to allocate credit selectively, as the
government has done at various periods in history in regard to, for example, the Penn Central
Corporation (1970) and New York City (1975)—it makes monetary policy less effective. See
Wheelock, supra note 269, at 12.
336. See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
337. As preeminent twenty-first century economist Anna Schwartz writes, alongside Walker
Todd, this breed of activism also misallocates scarce government resources:
For the Fed to lend directly to the Treasury, to government agencies, or even to private
entities that the Treasury otherwise would have to fund through the regular
congressional appropriations process, is a slippery slope. The costs of doing so are
politicization of the money supply process. As a general principle, the Fed’s charter
wisely prohibits such lending. Discount window accommodations to insolvent

SKINNER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

318

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/22/2021 9:59 AM

[Vol. 71:247

Reserve Act, after all, cautions the Fed that the Treasury “shall . . .
supervis[e] and control” the Board of Governors if and as their powers
overlap.338 Congress, for its part, may have already indicated some
irreverence for Fed independence by reducing the Fed to a national
piggybank with the 2020 CARES Act. And activism caters to the image
of a Fed that is subservient to the Treasury or a lackey of Congress,
thus increasing the chances that these practices become new custom.339
Just as legitimacy links to accountability, so too does
independence. Where the Fed steps fluidly—but unpredictably—into
fiscal and legislative roles, neither Congress nor the public can be sure
which master the Fed is serving, when, and why. Such questions beg
another: What interests are the Fed taking into account when
fashioning new policy?340
Ultimately, these rule of law problems create practical challenges
for the central bank. In a world in which political pressure might be
inevitable, central banks’ mandates are their commitment devices. It is
long-established that the Fed needs to be able to credibly anchor the
public’s expectations about what it will—or will not—do, to assure the
public that it will make technocratic expert judgments about the
economy, or the financial system, absent political considerations. The
public’s ability to trust the Fed’s commitment is crucial to its
legitimacy, as articulated above, but also to its ability to effectively
transmit its policies.341
institutions, whether banks or non-banks, misallocate resources. Political decisions in
those cases are substituted for market decisions. Institutions that have failed the market
test of viability should not be supported by the Fed’s monetary issues, and the Fed’s
discount window lending expands banking reserves just as much as open-market
operations do.
Anna J. Schwartz & Walker F. Todd, Why a Dual Mandate Is Wrong for Monetary Policy, 11
INT’L FIN. 167, 171 (2008).
338. Federal Reserve Act § 10(6), 12 U.S.C. § 246 (emphasis added).
339. See Jeff Cox, The Fed’s Main Street Problem: Worries Rise that Money Won’t Go Where
It’s Most Needed, CNBC (Apr. 15, 2020, 9:24 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/15/feds-mainstreet-problem-worries-that-money-wont-go-where-its-needed.html [https://perma.cc/DW8AZWCV] (paraphrasing George Selgin’s position that CARES is an instance in which “Congress
[is] using the Fed balance sheet as a ‘slush fund’ to juice the economy without the political
consequences”).
340. Along the lines of these concerns, Marvin Goodfriend has proposed a “credit accord”
similar to the agreement struck between the Treasury and Fed over monetary policy in 1951.
Marvin Goodfriend, Why We Need an “Accord” For Federal Reserve Credit Policy: A Note, 26 J.
MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 572, 572 (1994).
341. The Fed requires commitment devices due to the so-called time-inconsistency
problem—the awareness that central banks can always promise something in the short run (i.e.,
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This is to say that the public must be able to trust that the Fed will
keep its word and not be swayed by politics or the desire to multitask.
Only if the Fed behaves reliably, and with such credibility, can it expect
to elicit an economic reaction from its pronouncements about interest
rates or the banking system’s overall resilience.342 As such, it is only by
sticking to the boundaries of its mandates, and its informally
established rules and norms for exercising power,343 that the Fed can
maintain the credibility required for effective policy execution.
B. Activism Falling on a Spectrum
By this point, this Article has described a range of historical,
current, and potential forms of activism. It has also considered the
various threats to principles of classical republicanism that activism
might pose. Minding these cases and their implications, this Article
now develops a spectrum of legitimacy along which various forms of
activism might fall in view of: (1) how explicit is the Fed’s legal
authority to address a particular problem; (2) how much expertise the
Fed has with respect to that problem; (3) how robust are the
mechanisms for holding the Fed accountable for explaining to the
public and the legislature points one through three.

to pursue low inflation, to stress test banks) to achieve a desired reaction; but could then renege
in the longer-term after the intended impact of their statement has been realized. See Richard
Dennis, Time-Inconsistent Monetary Policies: Recent Research, FRBSF ECON. LETTER (Fed.
Rsrv. Bank of S.F., San Francisco, C.A.), Apr. 11, 2003, at 1, 1, https://www.frbsf.org/economicresearch/files/el2003-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/TMJ8-LM2N] (explaining
that
“[t]imeinconsistency describes situations where, with the passing of time, policies that were determined
to be optimal yesterday are no longer perceived to be optimal today and are not implemented”).
342. By issuing forward guidance about interest rates and releasing public information about
stress tests, the Fed uses its word and assurances to the public as a means of influencing the
economy. Cf. Ben S. Bernanke, Distinguished Fellow, Brookings Inst., American Economic
Association Presidential Address: The New Tools of Monetary Policy 20 (Jan. 4, 2020) (transcript
available
at
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Bernanke_ASSA_
lecture.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RDQ-2E9N]) (“The limits to forward guidance depend on what the
public understands, and what it believes. . . . [Thus,] [e]nsuring the credibility of forward guidance
is also essential.”).
343. The “Taylor rule” may be a good example of this. Ben S. Bernanke, The Taylor Rule: A
Benchmark for Monetary Policy?, BROOKINGS (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
ben-bernanke/2015/04/28/the-taylor-rule-a-benchmark-for-monetary-policy [https://perma.cc/T2
UT-3BW4] (explaining that the “Taylor rule is a . . . rule of thumb . . . intended to describe the
interest rate decisions of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee . . . However,
[some have] argued that [the] rule should prescribe as well . . . that it (or a similar rule) should be
a benchmark for monetary policy”).
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Activism is at the far end of the spectrum—high legitimacy—when
the Fed evolves policy tools to address a financial crisis. The Fed has
clear, multiple, and longstanding authorities to stymie financial crisis
in its LOLR capacity and with the use of its monetary policy tools.344
The Fed has over a century of expertise in this regard and a wide range
of nuanced tools that can readily be evolved.345 There is also a
significant amount of built-in accountability where these facilities are
concerned. They are statutorily time limited (“unusual and exigent
circumstances”), and Congress keeps a watchful eye through regular
hearings while the facilities are in use.346 As such, the Fed’s use of a new
tool (like market-based LOLR facilities) to combat an extreme or
novel crisis (like in 2008 and 2020) may be nominally activist but
nonetheless acceptable provided the use of those tools is transparent
and time-limited to emergency situations.347
On the other hand, use of the Fed’s balance sheet to ‘fight’ crises
is less clearly tolerable from a legitimacy perspective when it occurs in

344. See supra Part I.A.
345. See supra Part I.A.
346. See 12 U.S.C. § 343. The CARES Act created a Congressional Oversight Commission
to act as a watchdog for the Fed and Treasury’s use of appropriations. About, CARES ACT CONG.
OVERSIGHT COMM’N, https://coc.senate.gov/about [https://perma.cc/SF49-D5QA]. For the COC
hearings and reports, see Hearings, CARES ACT CONG. OVERSIGHT COMM’N,
https://coc.senate.gov/hearings [https://perma.cc/Z4WG-MVRE] and Reports, CARES ACT
CONG. OVERSIGHT COMM’N, https://coc.senate.gov/reports [https://perma.cc/R6W9-KLTT].
Additionally, the Fed Chair appears in front of the House Financial Services Committee and
Senate Banking Committee on a quarterly basis to report the current state of response. 15 U.S.C.
§ 9060(c). For the testimony of the Federal Reserve officials before Congress, see Testimony of
Federal Reserve Officials, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony.htm [https://perma.cc/N95D-6YDJ]. The
Fed, furthermore, publishes monthly reports on state of emergency lending facilities as required
under 13(3). 15 U.S.C. § 9060(b); see Reports to Congress Pursuant to Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act in Response to COVID-19, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/reports-to-congress-in-response-to-COVID-19.htm
[https://perma.cc/MJ9V-4CR4].
347. See Salib & Skinner, supra note 27, at 908 (accepting, even, an executive power of
override in times of crisis or emergency). Governor Waller has also remarked that
in times of crisis, coordination allows policies to be implemented quickly and forcefully
to set the stage for a strong path of recovery. But for this arrangement to work, the
political independence of the Federal Reserve is essential—it is the best way for the
Federal Reserve to meet its congressional mandate and allow policymakers to meet the
longer-term needs of the American people.
Christopher J. Waller, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Treasury-Federal
Reserve Cooperation and the Importance of Central Bank Independence, Speech at the Peterson
Institute for International Economics (Mar. 29, 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/waller20210329a.htm [https://perma.cc/9HHS-CDHC].
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ways not clearly contemplated by the Federal Reserve Act, or in ways
that seem more properly the role of fiscal authorities (like lending to
small business). It may be more difficult for the public (and Congress)
to scrutinize the Fed’s decisions when its lending steps outside the
financial system.
Policy frameworks also sometimes evolve. Activism examples fall
on two different ends of the spectrum. On the high-legitimacy side are
moves to modernize monetary policy taken in reaction to observed
changes in the domestic or global economies. This would cover some
of Benjamin Strong’s efforts at price stability in the 1920s.348 Some may
well even look with hindsight upon Strong’s pursuit of a price stability
objective as operationalizing that objective in a regime in which central
banking had severed the mechanical linkage between gold and the
price level. This view would also capture the ostensible reasons for the
August 2020 monetary policy framework revamp.
But on the low-legitimacy side of the spectrum is the use of
monetary policy tools to achieve political or social policy objectives.
This would be the case where the Fed uses its balance sheet to try to
make the financial system greener or uses the employment arm of its
mandate to effectuate greater income or gender equality.
Championing certain causes or acting as the first institutional mover in
structural transformation of the economy is more activism than agility
or adaptation.
Of course, the cases in this Article are not exhaustive. Other
problems and pressures will confront the Fed. But the traits are
generalizable: activism arises from popular or political pressure to do
more than Congress has instructed and often involves credit allocation
(that is not sector neutral) or use of discretion to pursue new objectives
that are not set out in the Fed’s statutes. The overarching lesson to
remember is that populism does not mix well with Fed technocracy.349
Regardless of where activism falls along this spectrum, guardrails
are important. Whether activism is ultimately judged as inevitable
adaptation, agility, or ultra vires action (or something in between) may

348. See supra Part II.B.
349. For a general discussion of central bank populism, see POPULISM, ECONOMIC POLICIES
AND CENTRAL BANKING (Ernest Gnan & Donato Masciandaro eds., 2002).
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come down to how well the Fed communicates its new endeavors to
the public and to Congress.350
C. Installing Guardrails
This Section briefly considers how the Fed might distinguish
adaptation of or flexibility in its existing tools—to address new
financial risks or macroeconomic emergency—from activism that
poses problems for its legitimacy. It suggests a framework the Fed
might use to communicate to the public, and accordingly, a framework
that Congress (and the public) might use to hold the Fed accountable.
Specifically, the framework would invite the Fed to elaborate on four
questions.
1. What does the law say regarding the Fed’s ability to target a new
objective with supervisory, regulatory, or monetary policy tools?
2. How will a new policy be operationalized, as a matter of law and
policy fact?
3. How will the new framework or regime interface with existing
Fed law and policy regimes?
4. What guardrails are already or will be put in place to prevent
legally inappropriate mission creep?

What follows is a brief explanation of how each prong might be
developed into a broader set of tools for the Fed to use in justifying a
new policy action as adaptation versus activism.
1. How does the law support the novel form of monetary policy,
regulation, or supervision? The first question to ask is whether the
possible policy target is a problem for the Fed. Inevitably, there will be
a range of important social and economic issues that may implicate the
real or financial economies, but they may not all be the lawful targets
of Fed power. Arguably, establishing a legal basis for policy action is a
necessary ingredient for the Fed to legitimately exercise its power.
Within this prong, there are two questions to be answered. The
first is what mandate does the Fed have to engage in a new kind of
policy activity? How, precisely, and with what concrete and verifiable

350. The Fed’s ability to communicate the significance of its policy moves along a spectrum
of adaption should be able to satisfy the requirements of Chevron deference. See Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (noting that the court will defer to an
agency’s reasonable interpretations of its statute).
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facts, does the Fed see this new manner of policy intervention as
required to fulfill its legal mandates? What kinds of data and evidence
could or should the Fed marshal to make an intervention case? If the
new intervention bears on monetary policy, what presently manifest
link is there to price stability or full employment—how will the
intervention impact the Fed’s ability to keep prices stable?
The second question within this prong is of a microlegal nature—
one that regards the Fed’s reliance on legal terms of art. Statutes such
as the Dodd-Frank Act—and the academic literature subsequently
interpreting that law and the events around it—spawned a new set of
terminology that now occasions policy responses. In particular, terms
like “contagion” and “financial stability” risk and “systemic risk” are
byproducts of the 2008 global financial crisis and the crisis legislation.351
However, while these terms have not been more specifically defined in
statute or regulation, they now operate as triggers for regulatory or
supervisory scrutiny and the development of new policy regimes.352
Should these terms be more clearly understood—and cabined to
certain facts—if they are to be the basis for expanded Fed
interventions?
2. How will the new policy be implemented? The second question
is a mixed examination of fact and law. Here, the Fed would need to
answer how a newly proposed or considered policy regime
accomplishes the goals it has set out.
a. Transmission channels. The big picture issue for Fed policymakers
is the nature of the transmission channel from policy to the mitigation
of any given risk.
b. Design choices. It would also be beneficial for the private sector and
public to know, and have some input into, the design choices involved
in the development of a new policy apparatus. There are standard
options to be sure. But to the extent other options are considered or
351. The phrase “systemic risk” appears thirty-nine times in the Dodd-Frank Act. See DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010). Important scholars, theorizing the mechanism of systemic risk, soon coined the phrase
“contagion.” Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Getting Up to Speed on the Financial Crisis: A
One-Weekend-Reader’s Guide, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 128, 129, 141–44, 150 (2012) (summarizing
contributions to “contagion” literature motivated by the financial crisis).
352. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (providing authority for heightened prudential and
supervisory requirements for financial institutions that pose a threat to the stability of the
financial system, e.g., a systemic risk).
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suggested, the Fed may also do well to make those details known and
invite conversation about feasibility, costs, and benefits.
c. Informal norms. In addition to spelling out the basic mechanism of
the new approach, the Fed would also need to make plain—to the
extent it can anticipate—any soft law or conventions that might
influence the application of the regime.
d. Communication strategy. A question for the Fed to understand
internally is how this strategy will be communicated to the public and,
in turn, how the public will come to understand that the Fed has been
transparent in its decision-making process. This kind of framework
would assist the Fed in communicating to the public, specifically, by
explaining how it comports with current academic and policy
conversations about central bank transparency.353 Explaining the basis
for new policy action would become an effort in transparency that
shores up the accountability of the Fed’s decisions.
3. How does the new policy regime interoperate with other central
banking frameworks? Third, it is important for the public—and the
banks—to understand the expected impact on other areas of central
bank activity. As the Fed expands its role in our economy, in addition
to its range of policy tools, this question of interoperability becomes
increasingly important. Some scholars, for example, have begun to
study the interaction between monetary and prudential policy—noting
the tradeoffs between ‘lean against the wind’ policies and inflation and
between capital and liquidity requirements and inflation targeting.354

353. For post-financial crisis burst of interest in communicating financial stability objectives,
see generally David M. Arseneau, Central Bank Communication with a Financial Stability
Objective 2 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2020-087, 2020), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2020087pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP7R-2JZM];
Benjamin Born, Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, Communicating About Macroprudential
Supervision — A New Challenge for Central Banks, 15 INT’L FIN. 79 (2012). For historical
literature on monetary policy and communication, see generally Matthew B. Canzoneri,
Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 1056 (1985);
Alex Cukierman & Allan H. Meltzer, A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation Under
Discretion and Asymmetric Information, 54 ECONOMETRICA 1099 (1986); Petra M. Geraats,
Central Bank Transparency, 112 ECON. J. 532 (2002).
354. See generally Matthieu Bussière, Jin Cao, Jakob de Haan, Robert Hills, Simon Lloyd,
Baptiste Meunier, Justine Pedrono, Dennis Reinhardt, Sonalika Sinha, Rhiannon Sowerbutts &
Konstantin Styrin, The Interaction Between Macroprudential Policy and Monetary Policy:
Overview (Bank of Eng., Working Paper No. 886, 2020), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-
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Will a new kind of policy program be a complement, a substitute, or a
distraction to other related central bank mandates and interventions?
Externally, there are similar questions to be answered. Will the
new policy regime implicate the fiscal authority of the Treasury? One
can see above how certain kinds of policy actions that seek aims similar
to, for instance, credit policy, give rise to Fed-Treasury tensions or
uncertainty. As well, it would be critical to understand the extent to
which the policy is likely to deter lending to certain kinds of borrowers,
thereby impacting bank credit intermediation, and, one step removed,
any “pass through” effects of the new regime that could affect other
parts of the financial system (i.e., nonbanks) and their ability and
appetite to serve as financial intermediaries.355
4. What are the checks against overreach and mission creep? To be
sure, the Fed—like all central banks—will be called upon at certain
intervals to modernize its approach and understanding of new financial
risks.356 But critical to the public’s acceptance of a modernizing central
bank is that bank’s ability to demonstrate the checks in place. Many of
the guardrails that could be offered up likely exist already, but clearly
explaining them to the public and to banks will make them more
robust—and, if need be, the process will expose any shortfall in
protections against inappropriate aggrandizement of power.357
D. What role for Congress?
In the end, perhaps we cannot place too much blame with the Fed
for being activist. Today, the Fed faces constant pressure from
/media/boe/files/working-paper/2020/the-interaction-between-macroprudential-policy-andmonetary-policy-overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/64EG-MJZ6] (studying the interaction between
monetary and macroprudential policy).
355. See Nina Boyarchenko, Thomas M. Eisenbach, Pooja Gupta, Or Shachar & Peter Van
Tassel, How Has Post-Crisis Banking Regulation Affected Hedge Funds and Prime Brokers,
LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Oct. 19, 2020), https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2020/10/howhas-post-crisis-banking-regulation-affected-hedge-funds-and-prime-brokers.html
[https://perma.cc/T6SD-78GS] (using studies to “suggest a pass-through of regulation from the
directly affected sector to other parts of the financial system”).
356. See, e.g., JAMES, supra note 6, at 1–2; Conti-Brown & Wishnick, supra note 14, at 645.
357. Traditionally, there has been little—if any—judicial review of the Fed’s actions, and
most assuredly not its monetary policy actions. See David Zaring, Law and Custom on the Federal
Open Market Committee, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 174–75 (2015) (explaining that Judge
Augustus Hand, in Raichle v. Federal Reserve Bank, established a “lack of a standard for
reviewability” for the Fed’s actions by opining, “It would be an unthinkable burden upon any
banking system if its open market sales and discount rates were to be subject to judicial review”).
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politicians, people, and the press. As in the case with all agencies,
actors within the institution have rational incentives to increase—or at
least retain—their power and remain relevant.358 Thus, against a
backdrop of broadly worded mandates to pursue “price stability,”
“financial stability,” and “safety and soundness,” is it any wonder that
the architects and leaders of America’s central banks can succumb to
activism?
Inasmuch as Congress seeks to hold the Fed accountable, it may
also be partially at fault. This final Section briefly proposes ways that
Congress could act to reduce opportunity for activism or stipulate
conditions under which activism might be acceptable—but render it
containable. These ideas, curating suggestions made by other scholars
that study power in the administrative state, cannot be fully developed
here. Rather, they are offered to give a sense of where responsibility
for activism fully lies and, of course, to plant the seeds for future
research on the role of the Fed in contemporary U.S. society.
First, and most fundamentally, Congress would do well to ‘clean
up’ the Federal Reserve Act.359 Since the founding of the Fed in 1913,
Congress has revised this constitutive document a handful of times—
yet each of these revisions was ad hoc and reacting to a particular
political economy and (naturally) interest groups.360 As this Article has
identified, activism seems to blossom at fifty-year intervals. As such, a
358. There is substantial literature on public choice theory, which essentially lays out
incentives for those in positions of regulatory power to retain or enlarge power by finding evernew things to regulate. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE:
USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1999) (arguing to apply public choice theory
to improve public law); WILLIAM C. MITCHELL & RANDY T. SIMMONS, BEYOND POLITICS (1994)
(discussing public choice theories and offering case studies).
359. On this score, the judiciary also has a part to play in scrutinizing the breadth of
delegations. See Goodhart & Lastra, supra note 320, at 62–65 (calling for greater judicial review
of central bank decisions); see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (2019) (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting) (“The framers understood, too, that it would frustrate ‘the system of government
ordained by the Constitution’ if Congress could merely announce vague aspirations and then
assign others the responsibility of adopting legislation to realize its goals.”). As one former Fed
official noted in 1993,
the Fed does not now have, and it never has had, a clear congressional mandate to
stabilize the price level. Consequently, the Fed’s success in stabilizing the price level in
at least some periods of its history has been and continues to be a function largely of 1)
prevailing general economic conditions, 2) the strength of the Federal Reserve’s
leaders, and 3) old fashioned luck.
J. Alfred Broaddus, President, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Richmond, Central Banking: Then and Now,
Speech to the Woodrow Wilson Forum (Apr. 2, 1993), https://www.richmondfed.org/press_room/
speeches/j_alfred_broaddus/1993/broaddus_speech_19930402 [https://perma.cc/R3GA-59DA].
360. See, e.g., supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text.
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review of these statutes every thirty years might be a rough and ready
guide to follow.361
Second, Congress may also wish to acknowledge statutorily that
sometimes activism will be inevitable. In particular, times of national
crisis are most conducive to such behavior. This is understandable.
Central banks’ original purpose was to stymie economic crisis; their
tools are designed to fight such wars. In these moments, where national
exigencies arise, we must assume that the Fed’s political independence
will cede to the government’s requirements at hand—be that
supporting the Treasury’s emergency economic policy or rescuing
American small business.362
Congress can legislate for these realities, blunting the impact of
these periods of activism on the Fed’s legitimacy and its independence.
There are two legislative measures in particular that could
operationalize this notion. For one, the Fed could possibly benefit from
a formalized power of executive “override,” where, as in the United
Kingdom, the Treasury gains a formal power to direct the monetary
policy operations of the Fed (or generally) during periods of crisis.363
Provided these overrides were “transparent, subject to legislative
scrutiny, constrained by clear criteria, and in practice rare,”364 they
could obviate the appearance of and concerns with activism. A second
idea, proposed by David Zaring, is to legislatively convert what are
today ad hoc facilities (like, the “Term Asset Lending Facility” or
“TALF”) into permanent Fed facilities, triggered upon certain kinds

361. Going even further than periodic review, Paul Tucker would have legislatures
fundamentally re-evaluate the purpose and role of central banks: “Advanced economies need a
money-credit constitution – one that makes clear what central banks are for, and recognises our
broader constitutionalist values.” Tucker, supra note 4. Paul Tucker would not, however, favor
this manner of ex-post control if it were exercised at too regular an interval. As he explains, doing
so would undermine the “purpose of [independent agency] regimes being for the legislature to tie
society to its desire mast.” TUCKER, supra note 25, at 125. It should be noted that Roberta
Romano has elsewhere suggested sunset provisions in crisis legislation for political economy
reasons. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1595 (2005) (suggesting that Congress should “when legislating
in crisis situations . . . include statutory safeguards” like a sunset provision).
362. See Waller, supra note 347 (“The virus . . . led the Federal Reserve to establish
emergency lending programs to serve as lending backstops and support the flow of credit to
households, businesses, nonprofits, and state and local governments.”).
363. See Salib & Skinner, supra note 27, at 977–78 (noting, based on the U.K. approach, that
legal overrides might “make a central bank less legally independent” but promote overall
institutional independence).
364. TUCKER, supra note 25, at 125.
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of predefined events and perhaps a presidential proclamation.365
Notably, each gives the executive branch more power over the Fed in
times of crisis, but does so within a clearly established legal framework
that the public and legislature can scrutinize and debate.
IV. CONCLUSION
As this Article has shown, central bank activism is an age-old
problem with some hallmark characteristics. Activism is enabled by
broadly worded legal mandates. And activism is reactive—arising in
moments of broad political and popular pressure on the Fed to solve
new categories of problems with its existing tools. Consequentially,
activism impacts our democratic structure, blurring lines of authority
between the Fed, Congress, and the Executive Branch. By thus
upsetting traditional separation—and balance—of power between and
among these branches, activism may be expedient, but it carries longterm social costs. This Article ultimately points to Congress as the
original source of Fed activism, and the most viable solution. Only
when Congress speaks clearly and deliberately, can society properly
debate its ideal role for the Fed in the United States today and over
time.

365.

See Zaring, supra note 117, at 6.

